



Managing Defense Transformation

Agency, Culture and Service Change
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Why are some military organizations more adept than others at reinventing themselves? Why do some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted?

This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. Through comparative analysis of some classic cases - US naval aviation during the interwar period; German and British armour development during the same period; and the US Army's experience with counter-insurgency during the Vietnam War - the authors offer a novel explanation for change rooted in managerial strategies for aligning service incentives and norms. With contemporary policy makers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new revolution in military affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to transformation has become critical.

Contents

Introduction; Part I Understanding Military Transformation: Explaining military transformation; Principals, agents, and service transformation. Part II Case Studies: The German blitzkrieg transformation: rebuilding preeminence from catastrophe; The US Navy transformed: managing change from sea to air; The British and armored force: squandering early innovation; US counterinsurgency in Vietnam: shirking transformation; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

About the Author

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