Introduction

What does eschatology, the study of the last things, have to do with phenomenology, the study of the things themselves? What does Freiburg have to do with Patmos? The key to unraveling this question lies in properly understanding the question. First, we must get a handle on these slippery concepts called “eschatology” and “phenomenology.” Only then can one begin to understand the conjunction between them in the title of this volume, “Phenomenology and Eschatology.”

Introducing Eschatology and Phenomenology

So, what is eschatology, and what is phenomenology? Let us take them in turn, beginning with the end.[1] *Eschaton* is the Greek word for end, and eschatology has traditionally been understood as the study of the end times. Most manuals of doctrines have treated the end times in light of four major “last things”: resurrection, judgment, heaven and hell.[2] The task of eschatology has traditionally been to elucidate these last things on the basis of scriptures and the tradition. For centuries, much of this study crystallized around interpretations of the Biblical book of *Revelation*, which was understood as a view of the future *eschaton* revealed to John on the island of Patmos. Like the book of *Revelation*, eschatology was usually something of an afterthought added to the end of a systematic study of theology,[3]

---

[1] Anyone looking for a more comprehensive account of these terms should consult, in addition to the works cited throughout this introduction: Brian Hebblethwaite, *The Christian Hope* (Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1984), and Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, 2 volumes (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

[2] Cf. David Fergusson, “Eschatology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine*, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 226–44; 226. In *The Reality After Death*, the second Vatican council affirmed eight eschatological realities which flesh out these four major last things; cf. *The Reality after Death* in *Vatican Council II: More Post Conciliar Documents* ed. Austin Flannery (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1982), 500–504; and Peter C. Phan, “Contemporary Context and Issues in Eschatology,” *Theological Studies* 55 (1994), 507–36.

[3] Jurgen Moltmann makes this claim in his *Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology*, trans. James W. Leitch (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1967). For example, the term “eschatology” was apparently coined by Abraham Calovius in 1677, when he used the term *Eschatologia Sacra* as a general heading at the end of his twelve-volume dogmatics. The term “eschatology” did not gain widespread use in German theology until well into the nineteenth century; cf. Erwin

"the final piece in the jigsaw of Christian belief, [which] could be set out largely in isolation from the exposition of other doctrines."[4]

This notion of eschatology changed in the twentieth century. Johannes Weiss, Karl Barth, and Jurgen Moltmann, in Protestant circles, Karl Rahner in Catholicism, and John Zizioulas in Greek Orthodoxy have all made eschatology central to Christianity.[5] This "eschatological turn" in twentieth century theology[6] emphasizes that the *eschaton* has real consequences, here and now, for theology, creation and the church. Despite a multitude of differences, one can see the seed of an essential relation between eschatology and the structure of creation emerging in these various accounts. In speaking of the early twentieth-century fascination with eschatology under the guise of the "kingdom of God," Christofer Frey writes that each "interpretation of the Kingdom of God includes *a priori assumptions of reality and history*."[7] These *a priori* assumptions "frame the horizon of possibilities"[8] of ethics, ecclesiology, biblical exegesis, and more. The influence and importance of the *eschaton*, then, is not solely futural, but works retroactively to condition the present and the past. If the kingdom of God is "not-yet" fully here, it is also "already" here. It is one of the hallmarks of twentieth-century theology to take seriously this "already — but not yet" character of eschatology. In doing so, eschatology takes a central role in any theological system: as the end which retroactively conditions the present and past, eschatology affects all aspects of a systematic theology. To do theology, one must now take eschatology seriously.[9]

Phenomenology is widely said to have begun with the work of Edmund Husserl.[10] While already nascent in his *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901), phenomenology emerges explicitly in Husserl's *Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology and*

Fahlbusch, "Eschatologie," *Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon*, ed. E. Fahlbusch et al., 5 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986–97), vol. 1, p. 1107.

[4] Fergusson, "Eschatology," 226.

[5] Cf. Johannes Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu Vom Reiches Gottes* (1892); in English as *Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971); Karl Barth, *Der Römerbrief* (1921), trans. Edward C. Hoskyns as *The Epistle to the Romans* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1933); Jurgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*; originally published in Germany in 1964; Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Crossroads, 1982); John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwook, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985).

[6] Fergusson, "Eschatology," 226.

[7] Christofer Frey, "Eschatology and Ethics: Their Relation in Recent Continental Protestantism," in *Eschatology in the Bible and in Jewish and Christian Tradition*, ed. Henning Graf Reventlow (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 62–74; 65.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Further examples of twentieth-century theologians who take eschatology seriously include Wolfhart Pannenberg and Rudolf Bultmann; cf. Frey, 66 ff.

[10] Thus separating "phenomenology" as a philosophical method from earlier philosophical uses of that term, most notably in Hegel.

Phenomenological Philosophy (1913). As was the case with eschatology, there are multiple meanings associated with the term phenomenology, and multiple strands of it as well (one often reads of Husserlian phenomenology, Heideggerian phenomenology, Sartrian phenomenology, etc.), so that determining exactly what defines phenomenology is a difficult task.[11] At the very least, phenomenology takes as its motto a return "to the things themselves" (*zu den Sachen selbst*). To do so, Husserlian phenomenology focuses on consciousness, and more specifically, on one's own consciousness, on the first-person perspective. Rather than some banal relativism, such a move is meant to ground phenomenology as a rigorous science;[12] by focusing on our own consciousness of phenomena, we can better understand the world around us, because, as the phenomenological notion of "intentionality" states, all consciousness is consciousness *of*, and therefore our consciousness connects us to (or constitutes)[13] the world around us.[14] By examining one's own consciousness, one retains the centrifugal force that is primary in our experience of the world: my experience of the world is always *my* experience of *my* world, that is, of the world as I live in it, act in it, influence it, am influenced by it, etc. Without keeping this central insight in mind, science risks losing its attachment to the world in which we live, conforming the world to abstractions rather than employing abstractions to help us understand the world.[15]

---

[11] This task is made infinitely more difficult by the fact that the most famous first generation disciple of Husserl, Martin Heidegger, is also the proponent of the main phenomenological rival to Husserlian phenomenology, i.e., Heideggerian phenomenology. Hence, from almost its earliest stages, phenomenology is torn in two.

[12] Cf., for example, Husserl's "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos*, I (1910–11), 289–341, trans. Quentin Lauer as "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", in Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 71–147.

[13] The notion of "constitution" in phenomenology is complex, and even Husserl seems to be ambiguous on exactly what it means. The reader interested in knowing more about constitution and how it functions to "connect" us to the world, should consult Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

[14] As Michel Henry states, "Phenomenology is the science of phenomena *in their reality*. Its object is not the ensemble of phenomena with their structures and, as a result, with their specific domains, but the essence of the phenomenon as such"; Michel Henry, "The Essence of Manifestation", trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 53. Husserl elaborates on the subtle critique of science mentioned here in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

[15] For a more in-depth investigation into the relationship between science and phenomenology, consult Marvin Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy,* 3rd edition (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1943).

The relationship of the individual to the world is central to all phenomenologies, due to its reciprocal nature: on the one hand, the world I see is always *my* world, that is, the world I constitute, and on the other hand, the individual that I am is always part of, that is, constituted by, the world. This reciprocal relationship between world and consciousness is discussed under many rubrics, including the Husserlian "life-world,"[16] and Heideggerian "thrownness."[17] This focus on the individual's relation to the world led Sartre from his early phenomenological works[18] to his later "existentialist" writings.[19] Gadamer, too, was undoubtedly influenced by the phenomenological movement with his notion of "horizons."[20] This idea of the life-world as constitutive of the individual is one of the major themes in twentieth-century Continental philosophy, and has its roots in phenomenology.

Though certain themes, such as the life-world, that have come to gain prominence in Continental philosophy find their provenance in phenomenology, this does not entail that all the philosophies that employ these themes (e.g., existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstruction, etc.) are phenomenological. There is something specific to the work of, e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Luc Marion (to name a few), that sets them apart as distinctly "phenomenological." Precisely what this "something" is, however, is a matter of debate in phenomenological circles. While some will argue that phenomenology has strict methodological controls, and is therefore defined principally by that methodology, others seem to include the study of figures who have practiced phenomenology within the field of phenomenology.[21] Phenomenology, like eschatology, is a broad field of study, including many disparate figures and ideas within itself, while still maintaining

---

[16] Husserl discusses his notion of the *lebenswelt* especially in the Fifth of the *Cartesian Mediations*, trans. Dorothy Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950) and in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution,* trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1989).

[17] Cf. Division I of *Being and Time*.

[18] Most notably, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936), trans. Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (1957) and *The Imaginary* (1940), trans. Jonathan Webber (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

[19] Including most of his plays and novels, as well as 1946's *L'Existensialism est un humanisme*. Sartre's magnum opus, *Being and Nothingness*, occupies a somewhat ambiguous space in between phenomenology (hence it's subtitle: "Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique") and existentialism.

[20] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 2004).

[21] Dominique Janicaud would be one proponent of the former (cf. his concerns in "The Theological Turn in French Phenomenology", trans. Bernard G. Prusak in Janicaud et al., *Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn": The French Debate* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), and Richard Kearney (cf. his contributions to *After God: Richard Kearney and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy*, ed. J.P. Manoussakis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006) and Dan Zahavi (cf. *Husserl's Phenomenology*

certain overarching themes. This broad nature is both evidence of its fecundity, and what makes it so difficult to define.

Problems in Phenomenology and Eschatology

Eschatology and phenomenology, then, while structurally similar, would seem to have little to do with each other except for a shared period of intellectual popularity (and that not even in the same discipline). One deals with the end times, the other with things as they appear to me here and now; one searches Scripture and tradition for answers, the other searches for answers within one's own consciousness or experience of the world.[22]

There is, however, one particularly fruitful area of overlap between eschatology and phenomenology. It concerns the question of time. For eschatology, the importance of this cannot be overstated: if one wants to recover the importance of the *eschaton* for the present and the past, as much of twentieth-century eschatology wants to do, then one must first tackle the issue of how we can conceive of a future time as being in any way effective for previous times. This seems to go against common sense notions of time as a line that moves from the past into the future, and not the other way around.

This issue shows itself in eschatological discourse in the debate between futuristic and realized eschatologies. In futuristic eschatology, the *eschaton* foretold by the Scripture is yet to take place: eschatological events are still in the future, and the best we can do is to try to predict when they might occur. This has been by far the dominant position throughout the Christian traditions. Realized eschatology, on the other hand, claims that the eschatological passages in the Bible were fulfilled already in Jesus' time; the *eschaton*, such as it is, is in the past. The sharp temporal distinction between past and future necessitates the sharp distinction between futuristic and realized eschatology: if things can only happen in the future or in the past or in the present, then the *eschaton*, discussed in the Bible, must refer either to future or past events, that is, events that have already occurred or that remain yet to occur.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) are perhaps proponents of the latter view of phenomenology.

[22] This emphasis on the first-person perspective – on *my* experience or *my* consciousness – is challenged, but not, I think, immediately done away with by the work of thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion. The focus on the Other that dominates in the work of these thinkers, I would argue, is meant to further clarify the nature of the self: I am not my own, but am hostage to the other (Levinas), am called by the other (Marion). The complex relationship between subjectivity and otherness introduced by Levinas, Marion, and others like them is hotly contested: it is either one of the most fruitful areas of current phenomenological research, or an abandonment of phenomenology altogether. Both sides of this debate are given voice in Janicaud et al., *Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn"*.

A way around this disjunction is suggested in the idea of an inaugurated eschatology. It suggests that the death and Resurrection of Christ have inaugurated the *eschaton*, but that some events (the Second coming, the resurrection of the dead, etc.) remain yet to come in the future. In this way, the *eschaton* is understood as having already begun, but not yet being finished: as being already (here), but not yet (fully here). One problem with this view, however, is that it needs to answer how the *eschaton* can hold together, e.g., the life of Christ told in the Gospel narratives and the Second Coming foretold there. At stake is whether the *eschaton* is still occurring, that is, whether we live in the eschatological age, or whether it has been interrupted, like a play taking a very long intermission between Acts I and II. Further, if the *eschaton* is on-going, then one must question the role of humanity in the events of the *eschaton*, whether we actively participate in these events, or whether, rather, they are merely things that happen to us, outside of our control.[23] And again, if we are involved, to what extent are our actions shaped by the coming events, that is, the future coming of Christ and the resulting full presence (*parousia*) of God with us in the world? If present actions are shaped by the future events, then the issue of how the future can be effective in the past and present remains pressing: without a revised notion of temporality, even an inaugurated eschatology is at a loss to explain the efficacy of future eschatological events for present and past events.

What is needed, then, is a notion of time that can take seriously the "already, but not yet" character of much of twentieth-century eschatology. Such a notion of time is a prevalent theme in phenomenology. Heidegger, for example, speaks of the future's determining of the past through his notions of "anticipatory resoluteness" and "projection," which leaves Dasein "essentially ahead of itself."[24] Phenomenology's reception in France only enhanced this thematic. While criticizing Heidegger for over-emphasizing the future, Sartre himself held that the future creates meaning for the past.[25] This entails that a person, in her freedom, is essentially a projection of what she is not yet, and hence she escapes her essence as expressed in her past.[26] If both Heidegger and Sartre emphasize the future,

---

[23] Richard Kearney's notion of a "micro-eschatology" seeks to answer this question directly; cf. Richard Kearney, "Epiphanies of the Everyday: Toward a Micro-Eschatology", in *After God*, 3–20.

[24] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §79 (German, p. 406).

[25] Cf. J.P. Sartre, *L'Être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes as *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Washington Square Press, 1992). Sartre's most explicit critique of Heidegger's focus on the future occurs on p. 451 of the French edition. His discussion of temporality occurs throughout, but especially in chapter two of Part Two.

[26] *L'Être et le néant*, 515.

Merleau-Ponty notes that the future must always be embedded in the present.[27] This does not, however, reduce the future to the present. Rather, it breaks up the finality of both future and present via the "ecstatic" character of subjectivity,[28] which enables the subject to be a temporal being, that is, a being that can reach beyond the mere present into the past and future.[29]

This notion of temporality is rooted in Husserl's discussions of the internal time-consciousness (*Zeitbewusstein*) of the subject. Through lectures over the course of several years, Husserl developed this idea of consciousness' awareness of time, and especially of the self-awareness of the internal time of the constituting ego.[30] These published lectures provide the theory of temporality that undergirds all of the notions of the efficacy of the future in the present and past that occur in the work of later phenomenological thinkers. Husserl's essential finding in this work is that our consciousness of time is inherently trinitary: in perceiving the present, we also retain the immediate past as it "runs-off" into the past (retention), and we anticipate the immediate future (protention). By opening up subjectivity essentially to the future, Husserl is able to emphasize the anticipatory, and hence future-oriented, movement of all consciousness. Unfortunately, Husserl does not discuss the idea of protention at length within the pages of *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time*, except to state that protention works like retention, except in the other direction.[31] This has lead to a great deal of confusion regarding how this future-oriented temporality functions.[32]

---

[27] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York and London: Routledge, 1962; reprint, 2002); cf. especially Part III, Chapter 2, "Temporality."

[28] Ibid., 487 ff.

[29] Jacques Derrida, with his notion of the messianic, would also seem to fall into this line of thought (cf. *the Specters of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning,* and *the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf [New York and London: Routledge, 1994]). His inclusion within the tradition of phenomenology is a matter of great debate, and so I have left discussion of him within this context to a minimum.

[30] Husserl, *On the phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)* trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic, 1991). All citations are from the German version, found in Volume X of the *Husserliana* series. Hereafter cited as Hua X.

[31] Hua X, 75. Husserl makes similar claims in §77 and §81 of *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962). This work is a translation of *Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, the two books of which appears as Band III/1 and Band V of the Husserliana series.

[32] Some of this confusion has hopefully been remedied by the relatively recent publication of some of Husserl's work from the years 1917–18, while he was in Bernau. Formerly accessible only in the Husserl archives (where they were known as the "L" manuscripts), they were published in the Husserliana series in 2001; cf. Edmund Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918)* Husserliana Band XXXIII, R.

Husserl's theory of internal time-consciousness undergirds the theme of temporality in phenomenology. By providing a notion of time that incorporates the past and future into the present, this phenomenological conception of time is able to support notions of temporality that see the future as efficacious in the present and the past. This would suggest that such a notion of temporality might be able to provide assistance to theologians working in the realm of eschatology, in terms of the problem outlined above.

(How) Can Phenomenology and Eschatology Help Each Other?

In discussing the problem of time, in both its eschatological and phenomenological guises, we have seen that both disciplines seek to make the future causally efficacious in the present. Eschatology seems to know why it should do so, but is not yet sure how. Phenomenology suggests precisely how this could work. Husserl describes his theory of time-consciousness in terms of "the transformation of the now into the no-longer—and, in the other direction, of the not-yet into the now."[33] This last phrase, the not-yet into the now, directly parallels the major theme in twentieth-century eschatology that sought to understand the power of the future (the not-yet) to act in the present (the now). The problem that remains, then, as the title of this book suggests, is to explain how the "not-yet into the now" of Husserlian protention can be understood, and can help us understand, the power of the not-yet to act in the now that characterizes eschatology. This is but one step in a more general project: the project of relating phenomenology to eschatology. What is at stake in this larger project, as has already been suggested by the previous discussion of temporality, is an examination of both phenomenology and eschatology. Holding these two together seems to promise a new understanding of each of these disciplines. The efforts in this volume aim at just such an understanding.

The first part of the book, "Phenomenology of Eschatology," seeks to begin the process of understanding phenomenology and eschatology together by examining phenomenologically certain key eschatological concepts. In the first essay, "The

Bernet, and D. Lohmar Hrsg (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 2001). Husserl discusses futurity and protention in much more detail in this work than he did in Hua X. As such, a renewed interest in Husserl's concept of the future has emerged. For more on Husserl's theory of time, cf. Toine Kortooms, *Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 2002). For more on Husserl's concept of the future, in general, and of protention, more specifically, cf. James R. Mensch, "Husserl's Concept of the Future," *Husserl Studies* 16 (1999), 41–64, and Lanei Rodemeyer, "Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Analysis of Protention", in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader* edited by Donn Welton (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 125–54, respectively.

[33] Hua X, 76–7.

Phenomenality of Anticipation," Jean-Yves Lacoste offers a sustained discussion of experiences both everyday (such as waiting for a friend's visit, or listening to "The Art of the Fugue") and more rigorously phenomenological (such as the experience of enjoyment/*jouissance*), in order to highlight the key modalities of anticipation and its manifestation in our conscious experience. In doing so, he distinguishes anticipation from non-anticipatory modes of givenness, and suggests that anticipation is a fundamental structure, not just of eschatological experience, but of our consciousness *per se*.

The next essay, "Awaiting" by Claude Romano, analyzes the phenomenon of awaiting both in its own right, and as it relates to Husserl's accounts of protention and anticipation. The rigorous investigations undergone in this chapter distinguish between awaiting as a permanent disposition of consciousness and awaiting as a consciously adopted existential posture. In so doing, they unearth a surprising connection between language and awaiting, a connection that has serious philosophical implications for a phenomenology of time and its relationship to the novelty of the event: one can only experience the novelty of the new in light of the more primordial expectation of a consciousness that is always stretched out before itself into the future.

Both of these first two essays, then, in analyzing eschatology from a phenomenological point of view, reveal that key eschatological concepts such as awaiting and anticipation are characteristic of human experience of the world in general. Hence, eschatology seems to play some fundamental role in structures of human experience and behaviour. But is the reverse also true: can the understanding of structures of human experience and behaviour provided by phenomenology also shape how we understand eschatology? The papers from the second part of the book, "Phenomenological Eschatology," suggest precisely this.

Richard Kearney's "Sacramental Imagination and Eschatology" uses the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a starting point to launch a re-evaluation of the nature and substance of eschatology, recasting it in terms of our everyday experience rather than as a grand narrative of the end-of-times utopia. By focusing on the "flesh," in its multiple phenomenological layers, Kearney is able to show that the mundane world is infused with divine depth. This is made possible in part by the development of a "sacramental" imagination of the things to come.

The necessity of the imagination for both eschatology and phenomenology is the end point of John Panteleimon Manoussakis's "The Promise of the New and the Tyranny of the Same." Beginning with phenomenology's re-evaluation of the post-Cartesian epistemological priority of the past over the future, Manoussakis goes on to show the significant repercussions this new account of temporality has for eschatology and liturgy. Here, Kearney's philosophy of ethics and imagination is brought together with the rigorous theological and Eucharistic resources of Lacoste and Marion to show, among other things, the importance of the distinction between fantasy and imagination, and the privileged place of the latter, in eschatology. What emerges from this sustained interaction between

phenomenology and eschatology is a philosophical and intellectual justification for eschatology to again assert its rightful place in theological discourse.

The last paper in Section II, Douglas Knight's "John Zizioulas on Eschatology and Persons," uses the work of the Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas to show that persons are necessarily plural beings who include and represent the entire world of relationships. Grounding this conception of personhood in the trinity, Knight goes on to show that, apart from God's empersoning power, the human is a tragic individual rather than a person. Humanity is then called to bring freedom to creation by freely choosing to participate in the life of God. By using this concept of the person to re-imagine the eschaton, Knight is then able to reconceive sin, creation, and Christology through this analysis of human personhood and freedom.

At this point, the book will have shown that a phenomenological analysis of key eschatological terms reveals that these terms are characteristic of human experience in general, and that this has enabled eschatology to be re-thought by way of resources taken from the phenomenological tradition. The third section of the book, "Eschatological Phenomenology," endeavors to show that the influence of phenomenology on eschatology is not a one-way street: not only do certain eschatological concepts shape human experience, but eschatology itself plays a major role in the constitution and self-understanding of phenomenology.

Ilias Papagiannopoulos's "The Eschatology of the Self and the Birth of the Being-With; or, on Tragedy" takes up the themes of tragedy and personhood from the previous paper, but employs them in the other direction, if you will: rather than using phenomenology to reconceive eschatology, Papagiannopoulos here uses eschatological resources to reevaluate the idea of the person, showing that the relationship between selfhood and experience in phenomenology has a necessarily eschatological core. Using a sustained analysis of the "tragic" character of Oedipus to illustrate its claims narratively, this paper challenges the standard metaphysical accounts of selfhood, finitude and negations, showing that the eschatological orientation of otherness as a call to or upon the self affects our understanding of the self's relationship with itself, with others, and with phenomenology.

Continuing the analysis of the eschatological constitution of phenomenology, the next paper, Jeffrey Bloechl's "Being and the Promise," demonstrates that an "eschatology of being" makes phenomenology possible by way of a call that issues from beyond our world. Tracing this call through Heidegger's later work, this chapter demonstrates that the "this-worldliness" of human existence is justified only by appeal to conditions that transcend it, thus placing a certain "faith" at the heart of phenomenological thinking. This "eschatology of being," and the notion of faith that derives from it, are then contrasted with the notion of a promise that grounds faith and leads to an "eschatology of love," which enables us to re-evaluate, among other things, the importance of incarnation and embodiment for both religion and phenomenology.

To bolster the arguments for the eschatological nature of phenomenology, the book next moves on to a study of the role of eschatology in the work of some key

figures in the history of phenomenology. This section, entitled "Phenomenology and Eschatology: Historical Confluences," suggests that the work of Heidegger and Henry, specifically, is fundamentally shaped by those thinkers' implicit and explicit interactions with eschatology. Given the immense influence of these thinkers on later strands of phenomenological thought, this section helps to reinforce the arguments of the previous section of the book that phenomenology cannot be properly understood without also understanding eschatology.

Judith Tonning, in her "'*Hineingehalten in die Nacht*': Heidegger's Early Appropriation of Christian Eschatology," continues and deepens the examination of the profound influence of eschatology had on Heidegger's work that was begun in Jeffrey Bloechl's paper. Tonning shows that Christian eschatology was a key factor in the formation of such key Heideggerian concepts as facticity, attunement, care [*Sorge*], being-unto-death, angst, and others. This discussion poses serious problems for a thinker who wants to distinguish sharply between philosophy and theology, as Heidegger does in his infamous 1928 lecture "Phenomenology and Theology."

Though Henry did not seek to distinguish so sharply between philosophy and theology, Jeff Hanson's "Phenomenology and Eschatology in Michel Henry" clearly shows that one of the fundamental distinctions that Henry does want to make, namely that between the "truth of the world" and the "truth of life," cannot easily be accommodated to the eschatology that emerges from Henry's work. Hanson shows that a certain "realized eschatology," which he traces through Henry's work, suggests that phenomenology is always "too late" for Henry, and that this has serious ramifications for Henry's notion of truth.

Staying with Michel Henry, Kevin Hart, in his "'Without World': The Eschatology of Michel Henry," discusses how an understanding of Henry's implicit eschatology also affects Henry's conception of philosophy, arguing that only a phenomenology with an adequate understanding of intentionality and counter-intentionality can provide the ground for a Christian philosophy in any meaningful sense, like the one that Henry supports in *I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity*.

The book then closes with an appendix, Jean-Luc Marion's "The Present and the Gift," which provides a classic example of the inter-penetrating influences of phenomenology and eschatology in Marion's account of "Eucharistic ontology." Through this careful study, which is at once an eschatological analysis of phenomenology and a phenomenological analysis of eschatology, Marion uses the Eucharist to develop a reinterpretation of both eschatology and phenomenology, further demonstrating that these two fields can be most fruitfully understood when one holds them together.

The argument of this book, then, is that the disciplines of eschatology and phenomenology overlap in a fundamental and meaningful way. In rigorously pursuing this line of examination, the studies presented here have opened up questions of temporality, ontology, ethics, and much more. Through these openings, we can begin to see eschatology and phenomenology flow together.

So what does eschatology have to do with phenomenology? In answering this, we have been forced to acknowledge that phenomenology is no longer the sole property of Freiburg, and eschatology has left the island of Patmos. Where they go from here, only the future will tell ...