

Introduction: Multilateralism, Peace Operations, and Europe

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Since the 1980s the number of the peace operations organized by the United Nations has steadily increased. Furthermore, regional international organizations have initiated an unprecedented number of peace missions. In 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was dispatched to Bosnia. It was the European Union's first operation since the introduction of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since then the European Union has been on the frontline of peacekeeping and peacebuilding throughout the world. During this time, the principles, rules, and practices of multilateral security have changed under the pressure of new conditions and problems. This book is about the ESDP operations *in the context* of the current change in multilateral security and peace operations. The European Union and member governments have chosen multilateralism as the cornerstone of the EU's international action. In security affairs, this choice has been implemented by building the European military and civilian capabilities of crisis management and conflict resolution. When these capabilities became operational, and ESDP forces were deployed on the ground, the EU's peace operation organizers and commanders as well as the EU's foreign and defence policy-makers became important actors in a complex, fluid, and tremendously important process, the transformation of peacekeeping, that has been in progress for the last 30 years. The original practice of UN-organized intervention for the sake of controlling truces and interrupting violence has been changed by the adoption of new forms of intervention that have given existing practices an unpredicted turn. Consequently, this book proposes, for students of peace operations in general and for students of the European Security and Defence Policy in particular, to analyse one, the worldwide experience of major changes in peace operations like the mounting number of regional, organization-led operations, the emergence of new peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors, and the extension of peace mission tasks, and two, the experience of ESDP operations and their concomitant problems such as the amalgamation of national security and defence standards, the combination of different foreign policy goals, and relations with the objectives and plans of the United States and NATO.

Scientific knowledge on peace operations is richly available today because experts and scientists have produced so many studies. In order to advise decision-

makers and conflict managers, initially, analysts were concerned mainly with the formal aspects of authorization, and the technical aspects of command and operation. However, research has gone on to cover topics as different as the growth in the number of missions, the functions of peace operations in the world system, the motivations of participating countries, the ethical and cultural aspects of planning and executing peace missions, and the problems of financing missions and distributing costs to participating and non-participating countries. Literature on ESDP operations is also rich and steadily growing. Indeed, the 1999 European Council's Headline Goals for building the European military capability of crisis management and the subsequent introduction of ESDP operations have stimulated the interest and output of EU analysts. However, contacts between these analysts and the wider research community are meagre and insufficient. Possibly, ESDP operations specialists have concentrated too much of their research efforts on investigating the 'building' of this important instrument of EU foreign policy, and paid scant attention to the large body of work on the different aspects of the multilateral operation practice, from the comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon in the development of world politics to the detailed analysis of single cases and issues. However, the inclination to concentrate on the building and early experience of ESDP operations policy as a *sui generis* phenomenon that develops alongside the worldwide phenomenon of multilateral operations is understandable because the European Union is not an international organization like others, and ESDP military and civilian capabilities are more than just the collective instrument of a group of countries. Suffice to say that ESDP is not a temporary instrument for intervening in distinct cases, but the first building block of the EU defence policy. Consequently, privileging the study of the 'Union' aspects of European peace missions is understandable, not to mention important scientifically and practically. Nobody can deny the value of having a good understanding of the aspects and phases of the Union's negotiation and decision-making process in order to facilitate, first, taking the unanimous decision to intervene in a specific crisis, and, second, organizing the EU multinational intervention force, which normally means assembling a delicate blend of national military and civilian resources as well as balancing different national practices, cultures, interests, and aspirations. Briefly, concern for these aspects may have turned the interest of the ESDP expert away from the existing huge literature and scientific debate on the features of and changes in peace operations. On the other hand, the wider community of peace operation scientists has not given specific attention to ESDP operations. With little or no interest at all in the subtleties of the formation of each ESDP decision, the generalist expert in peace operations tends to analyse Western (or the West's) peace missions as a single whole, and to count ESDP operations as a simple part of this whole.

The chapters of this book have been prepared with the aim of narrowing the distance, and promoting the dialogue, between the scientists and experts of ESDP operations and those working on the different topics and issues of peace operations and multilateral security. More precisely, the focus here is on change. The peace

operation research community is fully aware of the fast and dramatic change multilateral security practice is passing through in these times. ESDP operations specialists have been less attentive to these circumstances, even to the imperatives they put on European peacekeeping and peacebuilding policy. The chapters of this book are empirical analyses of both the changing practice of peace operations and the contribution of ESDP to this change. In this introductory chapter, the principal topics of multilateral security and peace operations are reviewed, the main traits of the changing practice are outlined, and the content of the book chapters is reviewed to highlight the knowledge presented. What should be done to further this knowledge is the subject of the concluding chapter.

Multilateral Security and the Peace Operation Mechanism

Multilateralism consists of international practices that are founded on principles of conduct widely shared by states, the equal participation of states in the rules and mechanisms of the principles of implementation, and the non-discriminating application of the principles, rules, and mechanisms (see Caporaso 1993, Ruggie 1993). Hence, multilateralism is different from other forms of international cooperation because it is not the action of many states founded on the convergence of their national interests. It requests, instead, that national interests are adapted to the principles that are formally accepted by the states. Multilateral principles and practices are normally created via international negotiations and diplomatic conferences in which state representatives agree on shared principles for problem solving, and consequently take responsibility for defining the rules and mechanisms necessary to implement those principles. So defined, multilateralism is a brand new practice in world politics. At the end of the Second World War, on the initiative of the policy-makers of the Western states' coalition, trade relations were modelled after multilateral principles and rules. A brand new international trade regime was created and founded on the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity as well as on the mechanism of the most favoured nation (see Cox 1992). The same was expected of the UN Charter negotiations in the area of security affairs. In fact, non-aggression, not threatening peace, and renouncing the use of violence or armed force except in self-defence became the principles of the multilateral security system of the United Nations. In subsequent times, principles such as the non-violation of human rights, eschewing terrorist practices, and the non-violation of disarmament and arms control treaties have been proposed, and accepted, by the members of the United Nations and other international organizations. According to the UN Charter, two types of multilateral security mechanisms are available to states: the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions, and direct intervention in the territory of states responsible for violating the multilateral security principles. The latter, commonly known as the mechanism of peace operations/missions, has since been defined in practical and legal terms. In particular, multilateral intervention is considered legitimate action as far as it is (a) extinguished when violence is

halted and other pre-selected objectives achieved; (b) authorized and organized by the United Nations, or another international organization, and conducted by the military and civil personnel of the member states; and (c) conducted under a multinational command that accounts to the acting international organization, in order to ensure impartiality towards the parties in conflict.

Since the 1980s the number of multilateral security interventions has been growing impressively, and multilateral missions have been given new mandates, not present at the time the United Nations introduced this type of intervention. In addition to a small number of interventions to interrupt aggression and violence between two states in conflict (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), and to interposition missions for controlling truces and cease-fires (Chapter 2 of the UN Charter), missions have been dispatched to conflict areas in order to interrupt domestic violence and to halt serious violations of human rights either committed by repressive governments or perpetrated in conditions of non-effective government. Up to 1988 very few peace operations had been dispatched by the United Nations to stop domestic conflict. In the following years, missions to halt violence and to solve domestic problems under the aegis of the United Nations became far more numerous than missions for interposition purposes. Today, *peacekeeping* missions, mandated to watch over truces and cease-fires, are distinguished from *peacebuilding* missions, mandated to stop domestic violence and accomplish other assignments like protecting minorities, transferring refugees, and reconstructing the political, civil and administrative structures of the target state, and *peace enforcement* missions, mandated to arrest violence, disband irregular military forces, and reconstruct civilian life conditions. However, various tasks are commonly assigned to a single mission. The military and civil personnel carry out simultaneously military, political, civil, administrative, and police tasks. Consequently, scientists and professionals are increasingly employing the terms '*peace support operation*' and '*integrated peace mission*', which encompass all important forms of multilateral intervention for peace, security, and stability.

Explaining Legitimacy and Growth

The general reason for the growth in number, and also types and functions, of peace operations is the expansion of the world public sphere. Under the pressure of interdependence, both international and domestic problems inevitably affect neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. Consequently, they become the responsibility of the world political institutions. The potency of the term '*responsibility to protect*', however, cannot conceal the critical consequences that multilateral intervention has on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, peace operations are a matter of debate. Even though the United Nations legitimated the principle of intervention in order to restore peace and humanitarian conditions in states troubled by civil war, humanitarian intervention raises the spectre of the *slippery slope*, as Semb (2000) calls the

problem of the legitimacy threshold of intervention. In reality, UN Security Council authorization is given usually on consideration of criteria like the probability of success of the intervention, and the sustainability of the economic costs of the mission. As Bellamy (2003) remarks, solving the dilemma of intervention is a matter of choosing between pluralism and solidarism. According to the former, intervention is unacceptable because it violates the principle of sovereignty which consecrates the self-organization of the primary human community, the state, as the fundamental public good of the world system. The consent of the government of the target state can legitimize intervention but only under the condition that it is not given due to external pressure. According to solidarism, avoiding human suffering is a good enough reason for legitimating intervention and putting aside the principle of non-intervention. The solidarity argument is complemented today by the principle of the responsibility to protect all individuals, including the citizens of a state whose government, for reasons of failure, negligence, and interest, does not protect those citizens as it should.

Solidarism is widely endorsed by the mass media in liberal countries, which explains why the mass media campaigns vociferously for placing multilateral intervention high on the agenda of the world political system. Usually, they represent peace missions as the best way to react to human rights violations, to solve humanitarian problems, and to deal with violent, inefficient, and repressive governments. Indeed, democratic states in which the mass media are strong players have contributed greatly to the growth in the number of peace missions because, in political debate and mass media messages of the last 20 years, peace and abstention from violence have been associated with democracy and the respect of human rights. Consequently, these themes were prioritized in the foreign policy of these countries, especially the European ones. Governments favourable to multilateral cooperation easily gained the support of the public to participate in military interventions, even in areas distant from the national territory, on condition that intervention was legitimated by the UN Security Council. At the same time, however, the media can be blamed for distorting public perceptions of intervention, and sometimes for wrongly influencing the decisions of governments. However, attention must be drawn to other factors in order to explain the growth in the number of peace operations since the late 1980s.

The most common explanation is the transformation of world politics after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power in 1989. This caused an increase in the number of domestic and international conflicts that, until then, the two superpowers had blocked. However, data on conflicts signal that the number of violent conflicts started to grow during the bipolar age, more exactly from the mid 1970s on. Jakobsen (2002) has drawn the attention of analysts to the pressure put on governments by the economic and political conditionality clauses of aid programmes that, since the early 1980s, have been issued by the world economic institutions with the support of the governments of the American coalition. The programmes of economic adjustment and democratic reform that were imposed on countries in need of economic aid had the effect of worsening the conditions of

economic backwardness, political repression, and social conflict in those countries. In the current circumstances of interdependence, the occurrence of multilateral intervention was caused by the domestic conflicts of those countries in conjunction with other factors, partly connected to the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States and Russia decided to reduce their aid to parties in conflict in countries that had become irrelevant to their foreign policy. Consequently, these countries turned themselves into *customers* of multilateral missions because of the shortage of funds needed to maintain their war actions. However, it is perhaps more accurate to argue that the United States and Russia preferred to transfer to the United Nations their engagement to support some regimes while the new climate of the UN Security Council allowed the removal of the informal, not strict, rule of non-participation in peacekeeping missions by the permanent Council members and the countries of the operation area. In addition, the end of the strategic rivalry in Europe allowed the Western European countries to employ resources to build up military and civilian capabilities of crisis management, and to organize the European Security and Defence Policy, admittedly for crisis management goals. On their side, the East European countries did as much as they could along the same line of action in order to earn merit for their application to become members of NATO and the European Union. Although the European and non-European democracies that contribute the most to security missions are wealthy countries, it cannot be said that the growth of peace missions is linked to the defence of economic interests. Statistical evidence does not sustain the hypothesis of economic motivation for supporting peace operations. Conflict severity, measured by the number of victims, is statistically the stronger predictor of a UN Security Council decision to send peace missions to countries anguished by civil war. The thesis that the United Nations intervene more frequently in countries exporting raw materials than in others is not supported by statistical evidence either (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Lastly, a very important factor pushing up the number of multilateral operations is the increased propensity of international organizations of all the regions and continents, with the exception of Asia, to engage themselves in local conflict management.

In conclusion, both demand and supply factors stimulate the growth in the number of multilateral missions. They are (1) the increased number of violent conflicts since the 1970s when destabilization hurt the structure of government of the world system; (2) the worsening of social conflict in countries anguished by economic backwardness, political repression, and social quarrel, which occurred in the 1980s and following years because the world economic institutions adopted structural economic adjustment policies and imposed human rights and democracy reform clauses on the receiving countries; (3) the devolution of violence control to the United Nations and regional security organizations after the Soviet–American rivalry came to an end, and the two principal countries of the global power competition revised their aid policy to governments and groups in armed conflicts; (4) the inclination of the political classes and the publics of the states of the Western coalition to engage in upholding the principle of humanitarian protection – also in order to promote the stabilization of the world economy – by taking on themselves

both the responsibility to protect and the largest portion of the costs of multilateral operations.

Multilateralism, Peace Operations, Hegemony

The literature on the issues of the legitimacy and growth of peace operations confirms that, in spite of inherent problems, intervention as a practice of multilateral security is coherent with the widened political sphere of the contemporary world system. At the same time, peace operations are the homeostatic mechanism of the world system for containing the negative effects of international and domestic violence on global security, and, consequently, reinforce the stability of the structure of government of the world political system. For this reason, some researchers have put on the table the question of the relationship between multilateral security and the hegemonic structure of the present world system.

In abstract terms, multilateralism as the practice founded on shared principles and state equality sets the aspirations of the hegemonic state both within the goals of multilateral organizations and under the control of the generality of the states. In concrete terms, the relation between multilateralism and hegemony is problematic and, therefore, the object of the conflicting views of the scientists. Some of them (for instance Keohane 1990, Martin 1993) maintain that multilateralism and hegemony smoothly coexist because the hegemonic state draws from multilateralism advantages like the reduction of transaction costs and the institutional legitimacy of intervention. On the other hand, it is true that the hegemonic state obtains from multilateralism benefits that are particularly useful to its role of government, like the containment of challenges from non-allied countries, and the stability of the structure of government in circumstances of power change. Other researchers (for instance Nye 1990, Cronin 2001, Skidmore 2005) maintain that the relation between multilateralism and hegemony is intrinsically weak because of the inescapable rejection of multilateralism by the hegemonic state. This occurs because the decisional power of the hegemonic state is restricted by the multilateral environment while the costs it holds are larger than those of other states. The head of government of the hegemonic state risks losing the backing of his or her constituency when the costs of complying with multilateralism are (perceived as) not compensated by large enough benefits. For this reason, unconditioned respect for multilateralism by the hegemonic state cannot be expected even though this state contributed to make multilateralism the constitutive element of the structure of government of the world system. On this point, scholars unanimously recognize that American society welcomed the post-Second World War decision of the national foreign policy-makers to place US hegemony within the multilateral institutions framework in order to share transaction costs with other states, and give stability and duration to the world government structure. This is true for multilateralism in general, and multilateral security in particular.

On the whole, hegemony and multilateral security coexist, but the hegemonic state, like every other state, participates in multilateral peace operations according to political interests. Moreover, the hegemonic state makes use of all the resources available to it to influence decisions on multilateral intervention, and to obtain from international security organizations favourable decisions on matters like giving command of the multilateral force to the same hegemonic state (as, for instance, in the Korea and Kuwait interventions), and authorizing intervention led by loyal coalitions and regional security organizations.

Furthermore, multilateral security is associated with the hegemonic structure of the world system because it reinforces the existing social order. Roland Paris (2000, 2002, 2003) interprets peace missions as the tool for transmitting norms from the centre to the peripheries of the world system, and points to the connection that exists between multilateral intervention and the political and economic programmes of international organizations like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. The same interpretation is made by Richmond (2005) and Chandler (2004a), to whom peace missions are the new tool of the traditional *realpolitik* of the great powers. Rather than borrowing from the realist interpretation of peace missions, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the current practice of multilateral intervention fits with the hegemonic structure of the world system because international hegemony, like all forms of hegemony, is not the mere dominance of one actor over others. In the Gramscian sense of the term, hegemony is the social force of the *historic bloc* that gains from the large majority of the system actors consent to its project of social organization. In this framework, the hegemonic structure of government of the world system aims to promote the political liberalism and market economy model of society prevalent in the historic bloc that comprises the leading social sectors of the Western world and those co-opted from other parts of the world (see also Puchala 2005). Consequently, multilateral security missions are both the tool of the world institutions for managing conflicts and reducing violence, and the instrument of the dominant coalition for diffusing its own social model. By defending peace and security through armed force intervention, and diffusing the norms and standards of the political and economic institutions of the liberal, market democracy, these missions propagate organizational and cultural homogenization to all the troubled areas of the world.

The Results and Efficiency of Peace Operations

Explaining the growth and functions of multilateral security does not say enough about the controversial issue of the expected results of intervention, namely the control of violence and the stabilization of the receiving countries after violence is interrupted. In evaluating the results of intervention, the difficult conditions in which any mission takes place must be taken into account. In the receiving states, governments are unable to exercise authority, and rule society. They use power

to repress opposition. Minimal security conditions are lacking, and mutual trust among social groups is missing. This situation feeds further social contention. Briefly, though consent to external intervention is achieved because no party is stronger than the other, conflict resolution agreements can hardly be reached. Moreover, as Diehl (2000) rightly underlines, the consent of the conflicting parties is not sufficient to warrant external intervention. The agreement of third parties important to the fate of the conflict, like states neighbouring the receiving states, is also needed. In these conditions, it is better to have low expectations. As Maley has remarked (2002), peace missions affect the symptoms, not the causes of the conflicts that multilateral intervention aims to solve. In addition, actions on symptoms such as violence and humanitarian violation frequently introduce unwanted negative effects like the breakdown of the social structure of the target state, and the introduction of new forms of crime. Lastly, it is difficult to begin the process of change wished for by the actors in the multilateral intervention because missions are usually under-resourced and too short in duration to provide or sustain the conditions that can bring order and stability to the receiving states.

Taking into account the difficult conditions in which the multilateral mission mechanism is applied, some studies have analysed the conditions and factors that make the consent of the parties to the interruption of violence more probable, and lasting enough to bring democracy and social order. In the analysis of 124 civil wars that occurred between 1944 and 1997, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) tested the importance of three conditions: the causes and origins of the conflict, the local capabilities of change, and the quality – that is, the type – of mission, and quantity – that is, the available resources – of external intervention. The main conclusion of the research was that, while the primary goal of interrupting violence is normally achieved, the probability of constructing peace, order, and stability is high only in cases in which (a) the cause of the conflict is not ethnic and religious, (b) the civil war is long in duration but not particularly costly in human lives, (c) the economy of the country is relatively good, and (d) the multilateral operations give large financial aid to the receiving countries. By analysing 38 civil wars in the period 1945–98, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) checked whether the duration of post-war peace depends on: the configuration of the international system – that is, the Cold War and post-Cold War configuration; the presence of democratic and semi-democratic institutions in the receiving country before the outbreak of the conflict; the nature of the conflict, namely identity and political-economic goals, high and low intensity, long and short duration; and the type of negotiated solution – that is, territorial autonomy or any other international mediation agreement. Their research demonstrated that the democratic experience, conflict duration, territorial autonomy, and multilateral intervention are all positively correlated to enduring peaceful conditions. In the analysis of 111 civil wars from the end of the Second World War to 1999, Fortna (2004) separated civil wars in which multilateral intervention took place from those in which intervention did not take place. She found no strong statistical correlation between the positive result of intervention and three aspects considered important by other researchers, namely the cause of

conflict (ethnic, religious, and so on), the form of violence interruption (victory of one party, peace agreement, armistice), and the economic development of the contenders. Fortna's data, however, confirms that peace has a high probability of lasting when multilateral forces intervene rather than when they do not. By comparing data on military interventions that were undertaken unilaterally by France, Great Britain, and the United States for the sake of democratizing the target country in the period 1946–96, and those undertaken in the same period by multilateral UN-authorized operations, Pickering and Peceny (2006) demonstrated that the success rate of UN-authorized intervention was higher than that of unilateral intervention. They explained that the UN interventions took place under more favourable conditions because consent to external intervention was given by all the parties in conflict. Lastly, Mukherjee (2006) maintains that multilateral missions are able to halt violence and create conditions for durable peace only if it is possible to make appropriate constitutional decisions. Reconstruction of the political, civil, and administrative structures of the receiving state depends on inducing the parties in conflict to adopt the parliamentary rather than presidential form of constitutional regime, and the proportional rather than majority method of electoral system because the former regime and system create the democratically correct relation that must exist between majority and minority groups. Achieving this result, however, is rarely possible because peace missions do not last long enough to build these solutions. On the whole, these analyses recognize that multilateral intervention normally achieves the immediate interruption of violence, but invite caution in respect to the long-term goal of the democratic stabilization of the target countries because a very long time is needed to produce democratization, and such a condition is met only in a very small number of cases.

ESDP and the Changing Practice of Peace Operations: The Rationale of this Book

During the last ten years, the security and defence policy of the European Union has been put in place, and military and civilian capabilities for crisis and conflict management have been made operational by the member states. These actions are consistent with the goal of *effective multilateralism* and *robust intervention* that the European Security Strategy, in 2003, declared as the main goal of the European Union in the global governance of security (see also Crombois' and Sabote's chapters in Part Two of this book). As of December 2008, the European Union has participated in 23 peace operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. To the 22 ESDP operations can be added the monitoring mission in Bosnia (ECMM/EUMM), launched in 1991 when the ESDP had not yet been introduced. Half the EU missions had completed their mandate by December 2008. In about half of all EU operations, the European military and civil personnel were participating in UN-organized missions. In one case, the operation in Sudan, the EU mission had been arranged in agreement with the African Union. The remaining cases were

either operations conducted by the EU and NATO forces or operations decided by the Union with the consent of the government and/or parties in conflict of the state where the operations were deployed. Since 2003, the number of EU active operations has been growing very fast, equally in and out of Europe. This signals the increasing capability and will of the European Union to act as both a regional (European) security organization, and a global security player. But, is Europe in tune with the current change in peace operation practice? The two parts of this book aim to answer this question. The first part elucidates important aspects of the current change in peace operation practice, the second investigates the contribution of the European Union to the practice change. By reviewing the main features of multilateral security and peace operations, this introduction has spotlighted the major aspects of the practice change, namely agency change, growth in number and tasks, and the evolving legitimacy/efficiency issue. The remaining pages discuss how the following chapters have analysed and increased the knowledge of the change in practice and the European contribution.

The most debated issue in relation to the change concerns the *agency* of the peace operations. Although non-UN-led operations have always been present in the international system (see Chapter 1), in the past three decades the change from the incidence of single-agency – that is, the United Nations agency – to multiple agency – that is, an international organization and state coalition agency – has been considerably high. However, the change has been far from neat. UN-led operations coexist with both UN-delegated (authorized/endorsed) regional operations – that is, regionalized UN operations – and competitive unilateral operations – that is, operations led by international organizations and coalitions of states with no UN authorization and endorsement. This change is analysed at the world level in the chapters in Part One by Attinà and McDougall (Chapters 1 and 3 respectively), and at the ESDP level in the chapters in Part Two by Riesche and Crombois (Chapters 7 and 8 respectively). Attinà explains the change using the global power competition model, and comes to the conclusion that the change is the inevitable consequence of the erosion of the global leadership of the United States and Western countries coalition. In this explanation, the ascending number of ESDP operations is understood as the hard political choice of EU's policy-makers to give the European Union an autonomous and specific role in multilateral security. McDougall, instead, analyses and compares two cases of peacekeeping and peacebuilding regionalization, and learns a number of good lessons relevant also to the peace operation policy of the European Union. For example, it is important to recognize that 'the power that undertakes or leads the intervention has to have sufficient capacity, military and bureaucratic, to deal with the sources of disorder' (p. 52). Applied to the EU's concern with the Balkan conflicts and the stability problems of the countries in the region, this lesson supports the experts' and practitioners' claim that a lot of work is still to be done in order to make the ESDP efficient enough to cope with serious problems like the ones in the Balkans and the neighbouring area. However, Riesche's and Crombois' analyses at the ESDP level approve the performance of the European Union as an actor in regional

peace operations. Riesche's comparative analysis of the EU's regional 'actorness' in the EUFOR mission in Bosnia, and the African Union's 'actorness' in the AMIS operation in Sudan gives analysts and practitioners a list of five factors for assessing a regional actors' performance in peace operations. Crombois' chapter, instead, looking at EU-specific factors of performance, is concerned mainly with the need for solving the problems of the internal and external coherence of the ESDP as the condition for providing the European Union with credibility and efficiency as a peace and stability actor in its Eastern neighbourhood region.

What caused the last 20 years' growth in number and tasks of peace operations is also the object of rich debate and growing research efforts in the expert community. Many explanations have already been proffered, as reported above in this introduction. On the whole, they refer to changes in both the world environment and the world political system. The former is epitomized by the complex interdependence turn of international relations as well as the advancement of new principles and values at the world level. Interdependence is responsible for the worldwide consequences of the violence and conflict that originates in any corner of the world. Normally, instability cannot be contained in any country or area, but spreads to the rest of the world, and hence jeopardizes the structure of government of world politics. Therefore, the multilateral security mechanisms put in place by the United Nations system have increasingly been employed to reinforce the world political structure as well as to punish the violators of international security conditions. At the same time, the advancement of principles and values like human rights and democracy as the foundations of social life and conditions for stability and development is responsible for the concern of international institutions and the major countries of the world. The UN's recently issued principle of *responsibility to protect* all human beings symbolizes this change, and legitimizes intervention by means of military and civilian peace operations. In particular, this change has brought about the expansion of the tasks from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, and has given birth to peace support and integrated peace missions. In this book, the growth in number and tasks is analysed, at the world level, in the Part One chapters by Attinà, Légaré, Irrera, and Sabiote (Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5 respectively). Attinà draws attention to the features of the agenda-setting and, especially, the coalition-building phases of the global political competition as the factors that set in motion the agency of international organizations and coalitions of states, and multiply the number of the peace operations. Légaré, instead, draws attention to the expansion of the peace mission tasks. In particular, she debates the inherent problems of reforming the domestic structures of the countries of intervention in order to fill the various aspects of the peacebuilding tasks. In this regard, she debates the nature of peace operations as the tool for expanding liberal democracy, and discusses in depth the issue of the relationship between multilateral security via peace operations, and hegemony both as the project of the leading/hegemon state and the project of the dominant coalition of global politics, namely the Western-liberal states coalition that includes the European countries. The European Union involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction of the Balkan states is an example of liberal state

reconstruction fully legitimated by the United Nations. Peacebuilding, therefore, is highly paradoxical since it restricts sovereignty in building autonomous states. This is an important lesson for European policy-makers. The future development of the EU's capabilities for crisis and conflict management must take into serious consideration the need for less intrusive ways to support peace and stability in the countries of ESDP operations. Irrera's chapter deals with a still neglected theme of peace operations study, the involvement of non-governmental civilian actors in peacebuilding missions. Her analysis enlightens the significant roles, namely knowledge-provider, peace-facilitator, and voice-articulator, these actors play in the transformation of the host societies to complement the peacebuilding tasks of the missions organized by international organizations and state governments. Irrera's argument is supported by a brief investigation of the ESDP Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the UNPREDEP mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Lastly, Sabiote's chapter in Part One touches on the very recent expansion of the peace mission tasks to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) of the host countries. The rationale of this task is probably the recognition of the linkage between security and development. Peacebuilding and reconstruction cannot avoid fulfilling tasks like police reform, judicial backing, and border training in the countries of intervention. Sabiote contends that security sector reforms have always been made in the appropriate way, and remarks that the reform of the defence sector and the transformation of police and the judiciary made by missions organized by the UN, NATO, and the EU have taken due consideration of the need for democratic control of those areas. However, she recognizes that the EU has made SSR a key aspect of its performance abroad, especially in the ESDP field, and expects that the Union will become one of the most proactive actors in the SSR area.

Analysis of the European contribution to the growth in number and tasks is made especially in the chapters by Attinà, Crombois, and Sabiote in Part Two (Chapters 6, 8, and 10 respectively). Attinà analyses the preliminary condition for putting peace operations in place, that is, the propensity of states to take on themselves the costs of intervention in violent conflicts and participation in peace missions. He examines whether propensity-relevant factors – political status and culture, economic wealth, population and army size, and international position – are present in a group of EU countries, namely France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. His analysis confirms the favourable inclination of these important EU states to bear the costs of peace operations, and consequently hints at the EU's proactive role in multilateral security. Crombois looks at three ESDP operations in the European neighbourhood, namely the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia, the EUBAM mission in Moldova, and the EUMM mission in Georgia. He draws attention to the European contribution to the changing nature of peace mission tasks as consisting in mixing conflict resolution capabilities with the civilian instruments of good neighbourhood relations that are specific to the European Union as a magnet of cooperation in its own region. At the same time, however, he remarks on the presence, in those operations, of the general condition of all regional(ized)

operations, namely the lack of opposition by other states interested in the region politics, in this case by Russia which has been hostile, instead. The same problem is key to the performance of the two ESDP missions in the Palestinian Territories, analysed in Sabiote's chapter. In these cases (the EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM missions), the almost hostile attitude of the United States caused problems for the European action, which aimed at the hard task of state-building by assisting the Palestinian authorities in police institution-building. Sabiote recognizes that the two missions are far from achieving their goal. However, she believes that the failure of the police project has opened up a window of opportunity for the European Union to increase its political profile in the Middle East conflict under the umbrella of SSR.

The *legitimacy/efficiency issue* has been all the time present in the debate on peace operations in both the political and the scientific domain. Generally, change in this issue has been slow, but to some extent important. Suffice to remind, the sea change, in regard to legitimacy problems, was the law of humanitarian intervention, and in regard to the efficiency problems, the resort to civilian capabilities and post-conflict assistance. In Part One of this book, this issue is the concern of the chapters by Légaré, Irrera, and Sabiote (Chapters 2, 4, and 5 respectively). They touch on various aspects of both legitimacy and efficiency. Légaré's chapter is thoroughly concerned with legitimacy issues, and remarks on the contradiction of peacebuilding operations as far as they aim at building liberal democracies and promoting human rights by making use of illiberal means to transform the host societies from the outside. To accomplish tasks like building a new institutional framework in order to restore order and stability, reconstructing administrative capabilities in order to deliver services to the population, reforming the local economy in order to manage resources adequately, and creating judiciary systems in order to foster the rule of law, the peace mission authorities make use of their countries' experiences and resources, and rarely resort to the tradition and culture of the local actors. To create better conditions for improving the legitimacy clause and improving the efficiency goal, Irrera's chapter points to the role of non-governmental organizations. Their priority is, indeed, on human and civil rights as well as environment and social issues. Furthermore, they are seriously committed to amplifying the local actors' expectations on social, political, and practical needs. Regarding the European Union, both Légaré's and Irrera's chapters emphasize the importance of moving towards appropriate decisions like those for adopting less intrusive methods of crisis management, and promoting the participation of non-governmental groups in ESDP missions. Concern for the legitimacy and efficiency of European operations is expressed also in the chapters by Riesche and Morsut in Part Two (Chapters 7 and 9 respectively). Riesche points to the authorization of the UN Security Council as the important condition of the legitimacy of a mission from the legal point of view, something that the European Union normally takes care of, but not always. However, political legitimacy is also important. This depends mostly on the proper behaviour of the military and civilian personnel of the mission, something that may be lacking in some ESDP missions. Lastly,

Riesche points to the need for mission actors to have a clear agenda and for the sending country to uphold a commitment to go through with the whole operation and overcome possible obstacles and set-backs, such as an unexpectedly high number of casualties or rising financial costs, something that has hardly been achieved by the European countries or any other countries of the world. On this point, Morsut remarks on the influence domestic political competition may have in hampering European states' resolve to complete an operation. She cites the case of the EUFOR operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Germany, which was in charge of the operation command, refused to undertake an extended mandate once the tasks stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution had been fulfilled because the government did not want to have to go through another vote in the Bundestag. However, analysis of ESDP operations conducted by the European Union as the partner of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the Artemis and EUFOR military missions, and the EUPOL and EUSEC civilian missions) allows Morsut to conclude that the EU acted as a reliable partner of the UN in guaranteeing peace and security. On the whole, the Congo operations demonstrate that in an EU–UN partnership, the two organizations can profit from their collaboration. Such a partnership gives the European Union the chance to gain respect and power in the international system, and the United Nations the opportunity to rely on a peace operations actor strongly inclined to bear the costs of multilateral security.

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