Introduction

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Greece was the first of the newly formed nation states of Europe to win full sovereignty and international recognition in the nineteenth century. To that extent, the 'London Protocol', signed on 3 February 1830 by the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and containing an annexe in which the Ottoman government gave its prior consent to the terms about to be agreed, marks a watershed in the history of modern Europe. Article 1 of the Protocol states baldly and unambiguously: 'La Grèce formera un Etat indépendant, et jouira de tous les droits politiques, administratifs, et commerciaux, attachés à une indépendance complète' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, 30). Another two years would pass before a further Protocol would ratify the final terms of independence (30 August 1832), and the fledgling state would have to wait for its formal inauguration until February of the following year and the arrival of the future king, Otto, aboard a British warship; but it is the text of 1830 that marks the defining moment when the efforts of the Greeks who had rebelled in 1821, and of their foreign supporters, the 'Philhellenes', were crowned with success.[1]

A few comparisons should suffice to illustrate the significance of this event. The Greeks had not been the first to rebel against Ottoman rule: the Serbs, having rebelled in 1804, and again in 1815, and having won their battles without the western intervention that would prove decisive in the case of Greece, were obliged to be content, in 1829, with a degree of autonomy that fell significantly short of full sovereignty (Jelavich 1977, 31–7, 55–8, cf. Glenny 1999, 1–21), a situation that would not be remedied until the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Romania and Montenegro would be recognized as independent states at the same time, while Bulgaria and what was then Eastern Rumelia would remain for even longer under nominal Ottoman suzerainty (Jelavich 1977, 156). In Western Europe, Germany and Italy, much the largest and subsequently the most influential of the new nation states, had to wait until the 1860s to win the recognition that had been accorded to Greece in that Protocol of 1830. Elsewhere, before 1860, only the Belgian revolt against Dutch rule in August 1830 and the Swiss inter-cantonal war of 1847 would result in the creation of new states, respectively Belgium (which was not however recognized by its former rulers until 1838) and the Swiss Confederation (Thomson

[1] For the relationship of the protocols of 1830 and 1832, see the editor's comments in Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, 27–8, 35–6.

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1966, 168–70, 213). It should be noted that Belgium, the *Conféderation Helvétique*, and Italy all followed the precedent of '*la Grèce*' ('Hellas' in Greek) in adopting for the new state a name borrowed from antiquity.

Viewed from this comparative perspective, the Greek Revolution against Ottoman rule can be seen as the earliest of the national revolutions of Europe (not excluding even the French) to be fully successful in achieving its aims, in the sense of establishing a lasting new polity based on legal and diplomatic recognition.

On these grounds alone one might have expected that the study of nations and nationalism, which has become a burgeoning branch of historiography and political science in the past fifty years, would have seized upon this historical moment when for the first time the principle of what we would today call national self-determination became the basis for the creation of a new kind of state – the first of many, in Europe and far beyond, as would be proved by events right up to the present day. This has not happened, however. Paschalis Kitromilides, in the chapter that follows, explores the 'epistemological' as well as institutional reasons for this, and suggests a number of remedies. In this introduction, by way of explaining the rationale for the present book, I examine what it is about the historiography of 'modern' Greece that has for so long obscured or distorted the wider significance of the Greek nationalist project, before going on to consider some of the developments in the theoretical and comparative study of nations and nationalism over the last twenty years that might be expected to promote Greek nationalism from a peripheral instance to the 'paradigmatic' status claimed for it by Kitromilides explicitly, and implicitly by this volume as a whole.

Greek historiography and exceptionalism

Almost every account of the Greek Revolution, 'Liberation Struggle', or War of Independence, ends by emphasizing not what was achieved by the treaties of 1830 and 1832 but rather the unsatisfactory, provisional nature of the settlement.[2] From the Greek point of view, ever since the early 1830s, the Great Powers had effectively taken away with one hand what they had granted with the other. This was most evident in the decision, in 1832, to restrict the territory of the new Greek state within frontiers that excluded the majority of the nation, and in the notorious client status to which nominally independent Greece would often be reduced in practice, throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. But these are problems that have afflicted small or relatively weak states at all periods of history down to the present, and have unjustly deflected attention from the *de jure* status as a newly created independent polity that Greece was the first in post-Napoleonic Europe to attain.

[2] Dakin 1972, 61–5; Woodhouse 1991, 150–6; Clogg 1986, 66–9, cf. 2002, 44–6; Gallant 2001, 28; Brewer 2001, 345, 349–51. Woodhouse the most strongly, followed by Clogg, echoes the predominant evaluation in Greek historiography that the settlement of 1830/1832 was so much unfinished business.

A more fundamental distortion derives paradoxically from the very success of the Greek national project. Even before the revolution of 1821, from perhaps as early as the 1790s, the proponents of Greek independence had established a powerful and pervasive rhetoric: the present-day inhabitants of the land that had once been known as Hellas were the children (*paides*) of the Greeks of old (Hellenes) (Beaton 2007, 83–90); to set them free would be an act not of radical innovation, as in fact it was, but rather the restoration of an ancient and universally beneficial status quo, the very one, indeed, that had bequeathed to post-Renaissance Europe everything that its educated élites now valued and enjoyed.

This was the distinctive contribution of the Romantic movement, in the arts and in radical politics, both to the emerging ideology of nationalism and specifically to the cause of Greek emancipation. The argument was expressed in its most extreme form by the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, in the preface to his verse drama *Hellas*, written in immediate response to the outbreak of the revolution in Greece:

> The apathy of the rulers of the civilised world to the astonishing circumstance of the descendants of that nation to which they owe their civilisation, rising as it were from the ashes of their ruin, is something perfectly inexplicable to a mere spectator [...] We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in Greece. [...] The modern Greek is the descendant of those glorious beings whom the imagination almost refuses to figure to itself as belonging to our kind, and he inherits much of their sensibility, their rapidity of conception, their enthusiasm, and their courage (Shelley 1943, 447).

Shelley, of course, was writing from a political position as radical as it was possible to espouse at the time, and his acquaintance with Greeks or the politics of their revolution was slight; but even among conservatives, one should not, perhaps, underestimate the subliminal power of this type of appeal during the decades of 'Restoration', when political élites all over Europe were intent on reviving the semblance of a status quo, perceived as superior, that had been irrevocably upset by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. It is certainly noteworthy that the signatories to the 1830 Protocol were the conservative governments of the Duke of Wellington, Tsar Nicholas I, and Charles X of France; although two of these would have been swept away by the time of the later version in 1832, and replaced by more liberal administrations that might have been expected to favour the radical aspects of the Greek cause, the changes to the terms of the treaty between 1830 and 1832 do not reflect that shift.[3] Modern Greece came into being, sanctioned, however grudgingly, by the Great Powers of a Europe still dominated by Metternich and allies of the stamp of Wellington. No wonder, therefore, that neither the Greeks themselves nor their reluctant European backers had any reason, after 1830, to advertise the radical nature of what had been achieved, still less to present it as a precedent that might be followed by other would-be nations. It would suit conservatives (of whom there were not a few in influential places

[3] Compare e.g. Brewer 2001, 249–50 with the texts of the respective treaties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, 29–44).

in Greece by the mid-nineteenth century, as Socrates Petmezas demonstrates in chapter 9), as well as radicals, to pretend that Greece was a special case, uniquely ancient and therefore like no other.[4]

Within a year of the outbreak of the Revolution, in January 1822, at almost the same time as Shelley's *Hellas* was published in England, the first Provisional Constitution for the embryo state would adopt for its citizens the ancient name of 'Hellenes';[5] this is how they have been known officially in Greek ever since, while the terms of self-designation in common use up till then, *Romios* and *Graikos*, would be consigned over time, in the one case to a popular, unofficial register, and in the other to oblivion by the early twentieth century. As with the name of the citizens, so with the name of the new state. This is why Greece, from that time on, uniquely among the nations and states of the world, has in certain contexts had to be distinguished by the addition of the prefix 'Modern'.[6] The process that had brought the independent state into being was routinely referred to in Greek as *palingenesia* ('rebirth' or 'regeneration'); other terms, such as 'revival', and even 'resurrection', were canvassed during the 1820s, as Marios Hatzopoulos documents in chapter 6.

So pervasive, and so effective, did the strategy of invoking ancient history in the Greek cause prove that as early as 1830, the only means the Austrian historian Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer could light upon, in order to overturn the hegemony of what he saw as an excessive Philhellenism in his adopted country of Bavaria, was to expose the historical errors on which it was based.[7] But Fallmerayer was already a prisoner of the rhetoric that he set out to debunk: it need not have mattered, in Munich in the 1830s, or in Athens in the 1850s, whether or not the racial and cultural line of ancient Hellas had been swept away successively by Romans, Slavs, and Albanians, as Fallermayer sought to prove. But the fact is that it did matter. Slowly

4 This ambivalence has now been documented, in the case of the German responses to the revolution of 1821, by Constanze Güthenke, who notes that 'the new flaring-up of insurrection against Ottoman rule', as viewed by Germans, gave 'hope of finding in Greece a paradigm for a country liberating itself', while at the same time, during the 1820s, 'Greece is almost unanimously singled out as different in kind from other instances of revolution' (Güthenke 2008, 98, 101).

5 Droulia 2004, 51; on the criteria for defining 'Hellenic' citizenship between 1821 and 1832, see in detail Vogli 2007, 37–157. One of the first thorough-going attempts to annex the term, at this time still normally reserved for the *ancient* Greeks, to a contemporary political context occurs in the anonymous republican manifesto, *Hellenic Nomarchy*, published in Italy in 1806 (Anonymous Hellene 1982; for the best account in English see Kitromilides 2006). Commentators, writing with the benefit of hindsight, have not always appreciated how revolutionary it was for a 'Hellene' to address his contemporaries as fellow 'Hellenes', as happens throughout this text.

6 Some influential British historians of Greece have deplored this usage, along with the reason for it, which they have seen as evidence for an unhealthy fixation with a past that is fundamentally irrelevant to the country's real, modern history; see Toynbee 1981, 8; Clogg 2002, 1. Indeed, the latter even controversially dispenses with the adjective 'modern' in the title of a book that begins *c.* 1700.

7 At least, this is the persuasive thesis put forward by Skopetea 1997. Fallmerayer's *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea* was published in Munich in two volumes, in 1830 and 1836. It has never been translated into English; the Greek translation, made as late as 1872, was revised and re-published in 1982. On the reception of this work in Greece see Veloudis 1982.

at first, but with devastating and long-lasting impact, Greek intellectuals fought back. No one seems to have thought, in the mid-nineteenth century, of abandoning a claim that could be said to have served its purpose in securing national statehood for Greece against all the odds, and might even have been deemed expendable, once its historical foundations had come under scrutiny and been shown to be vulnerable. On the contrary, the rise of historicism at the mid-century provided the impetus for a subtle shift of ground: the ruptures exposed by Fallmerayer would become precisely the ligatures holding together a construction as new and as daring as it purported to be ancient: the *History of the Hellenic Nation*.

In the monumental work with this title, published by the historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos between 1860 and 1874, as well as in the writings of the antiquary from Corfu, Spyridon Zambelios, during the previous decade, the revivalist rhetoric of the 1820s and 1830s came to be replaced by a rhetoric of continuity, which still holds sway today, and indeed was vividly paraded before the world's TV audiences in the opening ceremony for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.[8] Trumping Fallmerayer, Paparrigopoulos projected the term 'Hellenic nation', first formulated in the 1780s,[9] back through almost three thousand years of continuous historical evolution. From the 1860s until at least the 1980s, few within Greece would challenge this basis for defining Greek identity,[10] while those who did so abroad were liable to be branded, along with Fallmerayer, as 'mis-Hellenes', or 'Greek-haters'.

Greek historiography for over a hundred years was therefore trapped within the terms of a discourse that had evolved very rapidly from about 1790 to the 1860s and then stood still. Greek historians had no interest in reminding domestic or foreign readers that the nation state in which they took a justified pride had been the first to be recognized in Europe – in 1830. The stakes had been set infinitely higher by a national rhetoric that traced the continuous history of the Greek nation back to the first Olympiad in 776 BCE (and subsequently, with the discovery of the civilizations of the Greek Bronze Age, from the 1870s onwards, much further back still).[11]

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[8] See Kitromilides 1998, esp. 28 for the characterization of Paparrigopoulos's *History* as 'without serious risk of exaggeration [...] the most important intellectual achievement of nineteenth-century Greece'. On Zambelios, see Koubourlis 2005; cf. Beaton 1988.

[9] Dimitrios Katartzis, in a series of texts written between 1783 and 1791, seems to have been the first to use the Greek term *ethnos* in the sense that writers of the Enlightenment, such as Rousseau, used *nation* in French. Particularly revealing for the emergence of Greek nationalist terminology is the following: 'I admit that at the present time, we [Greeks] are not a nation such as to form a state, but are rather subject to another that is stronger. [...] [But] we do constitute a nation to the extent that we are bound together by our ecclesiastical authorities [...]' (Katartzis 1970, 44; cf. 22, 24, 104 and Politis 1998, 7). For a recently discovered exception which proves the rule, in that an isolated occurrence as far back as 1675 is shown to be just that, see Apostolopoulos 2005.

[10] A rare exception was the Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, Nikos Zachariadis, on whose radical rejection of the ancient heritage, in 1945, see Xydis 1969, 245 and Hamilakis 2007, 195 n.

[11] On this last, see the essays collected in Hamilakis and Momigliano 2006.

'Exceptionalism' of this kind – the claim that a given nation's history is built upon unique foundations – was the norm throughout much of Europe during the later nineteenth century (Lawrence 2005, 17–41). In the case of Greece, exceptionalism continued to dominate academic historiography until at least the 1980s. Its traces are still visible in the titles, and aspects of the coverage, of two standard works re-issued in revised form as recently as 2007 – *Greece, The Modern Sequel* by the respected historians of the modern period, John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis (2007), and the multi-author single-volume *Greek History* published in Greek by Ekdotiki Athinon (2007), which begins with prehistory and ends with the 'repatriation' of far-flung Greeks around the turn of the twenty-first century (while downplaying other forms of immigration). In the political life of the country, the grip of exceptionalism on the popular imagination was reasserted strongly in the protests that erupted in 1992 over the naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

It is only since the 1980s that Greek historiography has begun to emancipate itself from the legacy of Paparrigopoulos and to engage once more with international, comparative, and more theoretically grounded modes of thought (something that Paparrigopoulos himself had done in his formative years, as Ioannis Koubourlis demonstrates in chapter 4; cf. Svolopoulos 2006). Paschalis Kitromilides, in a series of studies of the growth of Greek nationalism out of the French and Greek Enlightenment, has brought an impressive armoury of modern political theory and comparative data to bear on a much-studied phenomenon.[12] A point of reference for many of the contributors to the present volume has been the revisionist account of the nation-building process in nineteenth-century Greece by the late Elli Skopetea (1988), matched by the new, historically grounded account of Greek Romanticism by Alexis Politis (1993). New periodicals, such as *Istor* and *Historein*, founded respectively in 1990 and 1999, have provided a forum in which mainly younger scholars have distinguished themselves. Antonis Liakos, in a career that began in the 1980s with an exploration of the links between Greek irredentism and the Italian Risorgimento, has gone on to place the historiography of Greece itself under the microscope (respectively Liakos 1985; 2007). Often, these new perspectives have provoked resistance at home, while sadly the barrier of the Greek language has delayed their impact on the international scene.

During the last twenty years, several studies have appeared in English, in which the dominance of nationalist discourse within Greece has been systematically challenged on theoretical grounds.[13] The disciplinary base of the authors has been primarily in literary and cultural theory, rather than in historiography or political science, and this may be one reason why there has been little sign of

[12] Kitromilides's Harvard PhD dissertation, *Tradition, Enlightenment and Revolution* (1978), has been published only in Greek translation (1996). Among many publications in English, especially relevant to the subject of the present book is Kitromilides 1998.

[13] See Lambropoulos 1988; Leontis 1995; Gourgouris 1996; Jusdanis 2001; Peckham 2001; Calotychos 2003; and most recently Güthenke 2008.

convergence between their work and that of mainstream theorists of nationalism. Anthropologists have fared rather better (*pace* the negative comments of Paschalis Kitromilides below), perhaps because in anthropology, Greece-based studies have since the 1960s effected something of a 'paradigm shift' within the discipline, as has been argued, from contrasting viewpoints, by Herzfeld (1987) and Just (2009). In general, anthropological studies, being based on observation at the present day, have less to contribute to the historical understanding of the nineteenth century than the twentieth, but it is noticeable that Herzfeld's classic study *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece* (1982) – a book whose subtitle finds an echo in the title of the present volume – is cited in one recent study of nationalism in Europe as its principal source for information about Greece (Leerssen 2006, 268).

Other initiatives from outside Greece have come from a variety of directions, but converge upon a theoretically aware and historically grounded approach to the phenomenon of nationalism. The volume of essays edited by Dimitris Tziovas, *Greece and the Balkans* (2003), goes a long way towards setting the agenda for future studies, more recently followed up by the wide-ranging study by Vasilis (Basil) Gounaris (2007). The quasi-colonial relationship between Great Britain and 'the Hellenes', from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, has been investigated by Robert Holland and Diana Markides (2006). This theme is also touched upon in the volume edited by Michael Llewellyn Smith, Paschalis Kitromilides, and Eleni Calligas (2009), together with the history of the discipline of archaeology in Greece, a topic that had been neglected until recently, but has now begun to converge in particularly interesting ways with the study of Greek nationalism.[14] In an important new study, Yannis Hamilakis, a Greek scholar based at a British university and writing in English, accepts the constructed nature of the modern Greek sense of the past, as many in Greece do not; but Hamilakis is also at pains to tease out local and indigenous modes of thought, for which he adduces evidence going back beyond the time of national independence.

Seen from these early twenty-first-century perspectives, the distinctiveness and importance of the Greek national project may be said to lie not in the *content* of the claim to an ancient origin, still less in unprovable arguments about its validity, but rather in the remarkable success of Greeks and their supporters, since the 1820s, in establishing the link with antiquity as first and foremost among the grounds for the legitimacy of the modern nation state. The question is no longer: 'Is it true that the modern Greeks are descended from the ancients?' but rather: 'How, when, and above all, *why* did it become important to anyone to think that they might be?' From that second question flow several others: 'How was the claim to continuity established, restated, and consolidated over the years?' 'What effect did this claim have on Greek fortunes, particularly in the successful establishment of the nation state in 1830?' And the crucial one: 'What does this extreme, and in comparative

[14] See Voutsaki 2003; the essays collected in Brown and Hamilakis 2003; and, in a fine study that links the history of archaeology with that of modern city planning, Bastéa 2000.

terms even far-fetched, claim to a legitimacy derived from the remote past have to tell us about *all* modern nationalisms, not only in Europe but beyond?'

If these questions have not yet been properly formulated, let alone addressed, by scholarship, the fault does not lie only with Greek national historiography and its long-standing exceptionalism, but also with the comparative and theoretical study of nations and nationalism. Without trespassing too far into the territory of the chapter that follows, I must briefly outline something of the fortunes of Greek nationalism within that broader field of study, particularly in recent years, in order to situate the present book within that developing context.

Political theory: from 'modernism' to 'ethno-symbolism' and beyond

So far as I am aware, there is not a single theoretical or comparative study of the emergence of modern nationalism that gives emphasis to the primacy of the Greek case, or discusses its importance in those terms. The exception, which may be said to prove the rule, is that by Paul Lawrence (2005), which features on its cover a close-up of marble columns in what is probably the Theseion in Athens; the picture is unattributed and no reason is given in the text for why it should have been chosen. In his Introduction, however, Lawrence states (2005, 5): 'it was during this period [the nineteenth century] that a number of new "national" states were founded: most notably, Greece in 1830, Belgium in 1831, Italy in 1861, Germany in 1871 and Romania, Serbia and Montenegro in 1878.' But apart from a brief quotation from Alexandros Ypsilantis that immediately follows, Greece earns only one further mention in the rest of Lawrence's book. Otherwise, some of the most widely cited general studies include brief, and not always wholly accurate, summaries of the Greek contribution.[15] Whether the Greek struggle was even truly a nationalist one at all has been doubted, on differing grounds, by such influential commentators as Eric Hobsbawm (1992, 76–7) and John Breuilly (1993, 139–43).

These omissions and distortions can be better understood if we briefly relate them to the development of the theoretical field since the 1960s. The paradigm that has dominated the study of nationalism ever since the influential work of Elie Kedourie has become known within that branch of academic discourse as 'modernism'. As late as 1983, Ernest Gellner, one of its main proponents, could reiterate the essence of the 'modernist' paradigm: 'Nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization [...]' (Gellner 1983, 48). This in turn derives from the categorical assertion by Kedourie (1960, 1) that nationalism 'was a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century'.

It is only to be expected that a thoroughgoing 'modernist' approach to the theory and history of nationalism would have had little time for Greek national discourse of the kind that we have just been considering – although here an honourable exception must be made for Kedourie himself, who included an important text

[15] See, for example, Anderson 1991, 72; Smith 2003, 199–204; Burleigh 2006, 118, 164–9; Leerssen 2006, 131–3, and the comments of Paschalis Kitromilides in chapter 1 below.

by one of the founding fathers of Greek nationalism, Adamantios Korais, in his influential anthology of writings on nationalism (Kedourie 1971, 153–88). In terms of 'modernist' political theory, almost everything written by Greeks and their supporters can be dismissed as either 'perennialism' (nations have always existed) or 'primordialism' (nations reflect the ideal, 'natural' condition of human society). These 'paradigms', as viewed by sceptical 'modernists', may be endemic to the nationalist project under study, but are usually regarded as inexcusable in the detached, modern scholar who studies the phenomenon.[16]

But if new generations of Greek historians and intellectuals are today directing a rigorous revisionist gaze upon the 'exceptionalism' that too often left their elders isolated from the mainstream, the mainstream itself has undergone significant change since the 1980s. Explicitly taking issue with Kedourie and his successors, Michael Burleigh has written, in a wide-ranging and often provocative study, first published in 2005:

> Nationalisms do not have tidy starting points [...] Nationalisms were rarely invented out of thin air, as those who wish to transcend them routinely claim, but were *constructed*, from a selection of pre-existing components, such as institutions, landscapes, language, law and, not least, local experience[s ...] that compose peoples' historical identities (Burleigh 2006, 157–8, original emphasis).

This, although Burleigh does not say so, is the position that has been progressively articulated since the mid-1980s by Anthony D. Smith and others who have emerged from within the dominant 'modernist' paradigm, but now challenge some of its most cherished premises. Known inelegantly as 'ethno-symbolism', this increasingly divergent approach to the history and theory of nationalism allows room for what Smith has termed the 'ethnic origin of nations', and some of his more recent work converges both with that of Burleigh, in placing a new importance on shared religious experience and institutions (Smith 2003), and also with that of a concerted band of medievalists who have sought to extend the prehistory of nations far back beyond the conventional start-date of the Enlightenment or the revolutions in America and France.[17]

Greek exceptionalism may still lie beyond the pale for 'ethno-symbolists' in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but Smith himself has suggested the ground for a possible rapprochement:

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[16] For summaries of these positions see Smith 2001, 49–57; Lawrence 2005, 181–6. Older studies of Greek nationalism, even those relatively immune to the charge of 'perennialism' or 'primordialism', have tended, for historical reasons, to focus on evidence for the precocious emergence of the phenomenon between the thirteenth century and the late eighteenth, a position incompatible with strict 'modernism'. See Xydis 1969; Geanakoplos 1976; Zakythinos 1976 (whose English title foreshadows that of the present book, although in an entirely different context). Even today, the presence or absence of an identifiable 'Modern Greek' consciousness continues to be debated as a criterion for establishing the chronological start-date for 'Modern Greek' literature: see Vayenas 2007 and the sceptical comments of Lauxtermann 2007, 129.

[17] See, for example, Armstrong 1982; Hastings 1997; Scales and Zimmer (eds) 2005. For a useful overview, see Lawrence 2005, 180–97.

> Nationalism and nations [...] are part of a wider ethno-cultural 'family' of collective identities and aspirations [... T]he process of nation-formation [is] not so much one of construction, let alone deliberate 'invention', as of *reinterpretation* of pre-existing cultural motifs and of *reconstruction* of earlier ethnic ties and sentiments. [... T]he Greeks afford a good example of this revival and reidentification through continuity of names, language and landscapes (Smith 2001, 58, 83, 84, original emphases).

In this case, Smith is, if anything, too trusting of the Greek evidence; as specialists well know, much of what he identifies here as 'continuity' *is* the result of 'construction', not excluding, on occasion, even 'invention' (as will often be evident in this volume, particularly in the chapters by Mackridge and Van Dyck).

More recently, Joep Leerssen (2006) has proposed a culture-based approach to what he terms 'national thought in Europe', extending the thought-patterns that would later culminate in nationalism back to the stereotyping of more-or-less 'ethnic' groups, a phenomenon that has a continuous history from the mid-sixteenth century. Leerssen's cultural approach is a welcome addition to the bibliography, as is his identification of 'a specifically European network of nationalisms, spanning Iceland and Bulgaria, the Basque country and Finland'.[18] He is surely right, too, to lay emphasis on the active re-use of forgotten elements from the past in the creation of national identities and aspirations: his locus classicus for this is the rediscovery of Tacitus's *Germania* in the mid-fifteenth century. But if Tacitus could provide a touchstone for eighteenth-century speakers of German to think of themselves as belonging to a 'German' nation, and if Caesar's *De Bello Gallico* could rekindle memories of forgotten 'Belgae' among the Burgundian subjects of northern Europe, the Greek appropriation of a past more antique still, and yet more prestigious, is treated by Leerssen as, literally, peripheral.[19] This is the more surprising as he is willing to concede, at different points in his account, that 'the most pronounced case of irredentism in Europe is probably the case of Greece' (Leerssen 2006, 174), and that the Greek 'language question' represents 'the first and most fundamental of such debates [in Europe]' (Leerssen 2006, 201).

Of the newer trends summarized by Lawrence (2005, 198–206) under the heading of 'Recent theoretical innovation', neither the feminist/gender-based nor the post-colonial approach appears yet to have taken notice of the Greek case in a comparative or theoretical context; conversely none of the studies listed in note 13, which in various ways fall within Lawrence's loose definition of postmodernism, merits a mention in his overview. This is the more of a pity, since a number of specialist studies recently have begun to converge on an approach to what Douglas Dakin, writing within an older tradition of historiography, had termed the 'unification' of Greece, proposing instead an explicitly post-colonial perspective.[20]

[18] Leerssen 2006, 165; cf. 169: 'one of the outstanding features of nationalism is that it is a supremely international affair'.

[19] Leerssen concludes his brief account of the Greek Revolution: 'Nationalism in Europe affects, then, not only the centre (Germany), but also the periphery: in Ireland and the Balkans' (2006, 133).

[20] See, indicatively, Gallant 2002; Holland and Markides 2006; Hamilakis 2007, esp. 19–21, 48–51, 123; and some of the essays collected in Llewellyn Smith et al. 2008.

All of this, taken together, suggests that the specifics of Greek nationalism, and the ways in which the nation-building process operated in the case of Greece, ought to be of far more central importance to historians and theorists of nations and nationalism than they have been up till now. Greek exceptionalism on the one hand, and its too-easy dismissal by 'modernist' theorists on the other, have together, for too long, obscured the formative role of the Greek experience in the creation of today's Europe of sovereign, nation states and of the worldwide phenomenon of nationalism.

About this book

These remarks are intended to establish both a rationale and a context for the nineteen chapters that follow. In them, the authors set out, from a variety of academic disciplines and subject areas, to explore the ideological concepts and developments that made the achievement of Greek statehood possible in 1830, and that throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century would consolidate a durable national identity at once 'modern' and 'Greek', the former often unconsciously, the latter always consciously. Individual chapters present original insights and the results of up-to-the-minute research into the processes governing the emergence, contestation, and consolidation of Greek identity during that period. Most of the contributors, within their respective disciplines, are specialists in the field of Modern Greek studies; all, in different ways, have been concerned to situate the Greek experience within the theoretical context of current debates about modern nations and nationalism, and particularly in relation to the three components of the book's subtitle: nationalism, Romanticism, and the 'uses of the past'.

The chronological frame for the book begins with the constitution for an imaginary republic drawn up by Rigas Velestinlis, at the cost of his life, in 1797, and ends almost a century later, with the celebration of the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896. As it happens, neither of these events has been singled out for special attention within the book itself; rather they function as convenient reference points. At the time when Rigas published his constitution for a future 'Hellenic Republic', no such state existed, and within a few years of his death the brand of nationalism it represented – 'civic', statist, modelled on Rousseau and the French revolutionary constitution of 1793 – had been displaced by the 'ethnic' concept that owes more to Herder and the German tradition, of which the defining properties would increasingly be shared religion, language, and to a lesser extent geographical provenance.[21] Almost a century later, in 1896, the capital of

[21] For the terms 'civic' and 'ethnic' in this sense, see Leerssen 2006, 101, 170. The shift, which took place during the decade 1797–1806, is well documented in Kitromilides 2003 and 2006 (for a brief summary of the argument see 2006, 58). The possibility that the Greek-language periodical *Ermis o Logios*, published in Vienna, may have functioned as the channel through which Herder's ideas filtered through to Korais, in Paris, is proposed by Xydis (1969, 226), and so far as I know has yet to be followed up.

independent Greece, Athens, was chosen by an international committee as the first venue of the newly revived Olympic Games, an event that would establish one of the most spectacular, and enduring, celebrations of internationalism in modern times. As has been convincingly demonstrated by two recent studies of that 'revival' (Kitroeff 2004; Llewellyn Smith 2004), the achievement of nationhood over the intervening century had not only transformed Greece; it had also very radically changed ways of thinking, both among Greeks themselves and those who interacted with them.

The book's sections are arranged thematically, not chronologically, although within each section there is generally an element of progression from earlier to later. In the first, entitled 'Nationalisms compared: the view from the early twenty-first century', the comparative, more or less speculative theme of this introduction is carried forward by specialists in their respective fields. Paschalis Kitromilides examines from an 'epistemological' perspective the reasons for the failure of Modern Greek studies so far to win canonical, or in his preferred term 'canonized', status in comparative and theoretical studies of nations and nationalism. In contributions that were specifically commissioned so as to be open-ended and 'essayistic', Suzanne Marchand, a specialist in German nationalism, and Henrik Mouritsen, a classicist who has written from that perspective on the Italian Risorgimento, explore the possibilities for comparisons with the Greek case. These two chapters also function as a counterbalance to the arguments advanced in this introduction and by Kitromilides in the first chapter, in that they sound sensible warnings about the limits to such comparability.

The remainder of the book, while by no means eschewing the comparative perspective, turns the spotlight for the most part on the specifics of the Greek case. Under the heading 'Towards a national history: Greek and Western perspectives', Ioannis Koubourlis and Margarita Miliori examine historiography around the middle of the nineteenth century; for both, the precedents of histories written in English and German prove crucial in shaping, respectively, the way in which Paparrigopoulos would move towards his national history of the 'Hellenic Nation', and the development of historical perspectives in Britain during the second half of the century. Common to both chapters is the formative presence of the eye-witness historian of the Greek Revolution, George Finlay, as well as new conceptualizations of the Hellenic past by Johann Gustav Droysen, George Grote, and, later, E.A. Freeman.

The two sections that follow explore different aspects of 'defining identity'. The chapters by Marios Hatzopoulos and Effi Gazi deal with religion, a topic much discussed in relation to nationalism in recent comparative studies, but often taken for granted with respect to Greece; here broader concepts and insights associated with the work of Anthony D. Smith and Michael Burleigh are firmly anchored in the context of the Greek historical evidence, which can produce some surprising conclusions. For Hatzopoulos, the rhetoric of the Greek Revolution is less uniformly secular than might have been expected, with a strong admixture of terms derived

from the Orthodox tradition; Gazi, reviewing the role of religion in the early decades of the independent Greek state, uncovers a multifaceted flexibility in the construction of a national religious tradition that was not always, by any means, in conflict with Protestantism.

Another aspect of 'defining identity', in the Greek context, has always been the potential for conflict between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. The contested roles of 'autochthons', or 'inside Greeks', those born within the boundaries of the kingdom established in 1832, and 'heterochthons', those born outside, are examined by Yanna Delivoria through case studies in the memoirs of former fighters in the Revolution. Then Socrates Petmezas takes up the story, identifying the dominant ideology of the mid-century with an élite group whom he terms 'Romantics', and whose careers and ideas turn out to owe much to the shared status of the group as outsiders. Finally under this heading, Basil Gounaris contrasts the inclusivity with which Greek nationalists had hailed their Balkan brethren in the first half of the nineteenth century with the mutual hostility that developed after the 'Bulgarian Schism' of 1870 and the emergence of competing nationalisms in the Balkans.

The colonial perspective makes an explicit appearance in two short papers devoted to the Ionian Islands under the British Protectorate, which lasted from 1815 to 1864. In the first, Eleni Calligas argues that the Radical Party in the islands was the first modern-style political party based on ideological principles to function in Greek lands; in the second, Athanasios Gekas asks pertinent economic and social questions in the attempt to bypass the dominant nationalist rhetoric of the publications of the period, to suggest that the 'national' question may have been subordinate, in the minds of many Ionians under British rule, to issues of debt and social status that would remain unresolved long after the absorption of the islands into the Greek state.

One of the pillars of national identity, throughout Europe, since at least the early nineteenth century, has always been language. The notorious Greek 'language question' that divided intellectuals and sections of Greek society, particularly at the two ends of the period surveyed by the volume, is revisited in contrasting ways by Peter Mackridge and Karen Van Dyck. The former situates the Greek controversy in the context of other languages whose written form has been similarly constructed in modern times, including Norwegian, Hebrew, and Arabic; the latter connects language with the issue of 'insiders' and 'outsiders', arguing that the most thoroughgoing pursuit of a national language was carried on outside the Greek state, by individuals who in one way or another could be said to have been more at home among the Diaspora.

If nations are to be considered as 'imagined communities', in the controversial formulation of Benedict Anderson that is a frequent point of reference in this book, then it may reasonably be expected that the literature of an emergent nation will be one of the prime sites where that process of 'imagining' can be detected in action. If theoretical justification be needed for the inclusion of no fewer than five chapters on literature, this must surely be part of it. Another is that while historians and

political theorists have often fought shy of straying into the preserve of the literary scholar, studies of Modern Greek literature have, by contrast, tended to address historical issues, including the nature and development of national identity as these can be traced in specific texts.

Vassiliki Dimoula tackles the problematic interaction between nationalist ideology and Romantic poetics in the case of the 'national' poet Solomos, drawing on twentieth-century literary theory and comparative material from German poetry of the early nineteenth century. Romanticism again figures prominently in the study by Dimitris Tziovas of the first novel to be published in independent Greece, whose unusual blend of strengths and weaknesses he argues would leave a lasting legacy in Greek fiction down to at least the mid-twentieth century. Alexis Politis, starting from a wryly evinced belief in the superiority of quantitative data, presents hitherto unknown statistical information on the literary output of urban centres outside Athens during the nineteenth century, to conclude that the pursuit of a national agenda in literature, or the self-conscious creation of a 'national' literature, was the exception, rather than the rule, away from the capital. Michalis Chryssanthopoulos examines the interplay of historiography and autobiography in the career of one of the most versatile of Greek *littérateurs* in the closing years of the nineteenth century, Dimitrios Vikelas, who among others things played a leading role in bringing the first modern Olympic Games to Athens in 1896. The end-point of the Athens Olympics is also signalled in the final chapter, by David Ricks, who contrasts the contributions to the Olympic celebrations by the poet Palamas and the short-story writer Alexandros Papadiamantis, and teases out the implications of the latter's equivocal praise for the Greek national project and corresponding nostalgic allegiance to the rapidly disappearing world of the Orthodox oecumene.

If the last chapter brings the subject matter of the book back close to its starting-point, in revisiting the uneasy relationship between religion and nationalism from the point of view of the writer of literature, this fact serves to underscore the essential relatedness of all the topics examined here. It is in the nature of nationalism, as a cultural phenomenon, to reach into many otherwise separate discourses and forms of human activity. Nationalism is a phenomenon that, despite repeated prophecies of its imminent demise, retains great power in the world around us in the early twenty-first century. In this respect, the words of Ernest Renan, written in 1882, may be taken as all too prescient:

> Nations are not something eternal. They began, so they will come to an end. A European confederation will probably replace them. Such, however, is not the law of the century we are living in. At the present time, the existence of nations is good, even necessary. Their existence is a guarantee of freedom, which would be lost if the world had only one law and one master (Renan 1995, 59).

This book is neither for nor against nationalism; it sets out neither to uphold nor to debunk the particular claims put forward, between one and two centuries ago, for *Greek* nationalism, with which it deals. There is much more to be said, both about the specific Greek case and about the wider phenomenon of which it forms

a part. But on behalf of all who have worked to bring this volume to fruition, I would like to express the hope that we have played our part in ending the surprising isolation of Greece and Greek studies among historians and theorists of nationalism in the modern world.

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