Introduction

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It has been claimed that the natural sciences have abstracted for themselves a 'material world' set apart from human concerns, and the social sciences, in their turn, constructed 'a world of actors devoid of things' (Joerges,1988, p. 220). A dualism between people and things has certainly been institutionalized in the very distinction between the natural and human sciences. Yet, the situation is more complicated and in some respects even worse than that. There is great diversity among the human sciences in their focus on objects. At one extreme, archaeology would seem obliged by its very nature to take into account human tools and artefacts. At the other extreme, mainstream psychology with its emphasis upon internal mental structures, and commitment to stimulus-response thinking, has presented us with a world not just devoid of things but also of agents.

As psychologists critical of the neglect of the material conditions of human thought and action, we were keen to bring together a number of researchers in the human sciences who have been taking *things* more seriously, and whose work interconnects in several distinctive and important ways. This book stems from two interdisciplinary meetings we organized at the University of Copenhagen. In addition to the discussions held at these meetings, the later drafts of the chapters were circulated among all of the contributors to make the individual contributions speak more directly to each other and to common issues. We are grateful to Benny Karpatschof and Kurt Keller, who also took part in the workshops, for their insightful commentaries on the following chapters. We would also like to thank the Danish Research Council for the Humanities for funding the workshops; the Department of Psychology, Copenhagen University for hosting the meetings and providing a visiting professorship for Alan Costall which led to our joint project.

This book reflects a growing interest within the human sciences about how people relate to objects. However, the standard approaches assume that the meanings of things can be *localized* – within the things themselves, *or* within our heads, *or* within our 'discourse'. Furthermore, most of the recent work in this field has also been concerned with how people cope with new technologies, with an emphasis as much on the novelty of these technologies as upon their highly technical nature. In contrast, the contributors to the present book mainly focus on everyday objects and how these objects enter into our activities over the course of time. Indeed, even though we have included some chapters concerned with the use of 'high-tech' objects, these also approach such objects as parts of ongoing everyday activities. The

chapters also reflect a distinctive and coherent combination of different theoretical approaches, including actor network theory, ecological psychology, cognitive linguistics, and science and technology studies. What unites the contributors to this book is not just their rejection of the standard notion of objects and their properties as inert, inherently meaningless, and quite alien to ourselves. All of the contributors emphasize the need to understand the relations between people and objects in terms of process and change.

I. Intentionality and the Functionality of Things

The first two chapters address a fundamental issue taken up again in many of the later chapters. Although any particular object lends itself to a limitless number of possible uses, many of the objects we encounter nevertheless present us with their own unique meaning: an apple, for example, is 'for eating', even though it can be thrown, or used as a paperweight, or even as a target for archery. Both Beth Preston and also Pieter Vermaas and Wybo Houkes critically examine the standard philosophical accounts of the 'proper function' of artefacts (notably, Ruth Millikan's writings) and present alternative analyses. As a whole the discussion is framed in terms of three supposedly distinctive roles for human agents with regard to artefacts – designer, maker, and user. While Preston argues that the intentions of the designer are not sufficient for establishing proper function, Vermaas and Houkes defend such an intentionalist approach to artefacts and artefact use.

The standard view of artefacts assumes that the design, making and use of artefacts are quite distinct and separate activities. In her chapter, 'The case of the recalcitrant prototype', Beth Preston points out that while users often use artefacts creatively for purposes other than their designers had in mind – and, in so doing, also modify them – standard theories of how artefact functions are established privilege the intentions of designers. The use of artefacts is then said to rest on their 'proper function' as opposed to a contingent, occasional 'system function'. Preston argues that a distinction between proper function and system function is necessary in order to prevent the proper functions of artefacts from proliferating in an uncontrolled and incoherent way. At the same time, however, this distinction makes the view that artefact function is established by designers' intentions problematic. To resolve this dilemma, Preston proposes that a history of selection and reproduction, rather than the intentions of designers, establishes the (direct and derived) proper functions of an artefact. In accounting for how artefacts get their functions neither proper function nor system function then require an appeal to intentions.

Pieter Vermaas and Wybo Houkes present an action-theoretical view of artefacts in their chapter on 'Use plans and artefact functions: an intentionalist approach to artefacts and their use'. They reject the strong emphasis on functionality in the standard view of artefacts, and endorse a version of intentionalism by describing artefact design and use primarily in terms of plans: that is, structured sequences of considered actions. Users, they argue, may take artefacts simply as a means of

attaining their own desired ends and thus be primarily interested in their own plans for realising those ends without even supposing that artefacts have functions. This question about what something is *for*, should, on their view, be understood in terms of how and for what goals that thing could be used. In designing, designers construct what Vermaas and Houkes call 'use plans' for the artefacts they are designing. The concept of proper use may now be maintained by claiming that use plans for artefacts constructed by designers hold a privileged position relative to other plans. Consequently, the proper use of an artefact is the use that follows a plan that is approximately identical to the use plan developed by its designers.

A further distinction can also be made between good (rational) and bad (irrational) use, which is independent of the distinction between proper and non-standard use, allowing us to recognise the rationality of non-standard uses of artefacts. Vermaas and Houkes argue that action plans are incomplete 'lightweight plans' with respect to both the necessary skills involved and the circumstances of their realisation. Furthermore, they see the functions of an artefact as corresponding to those dispositions of the artefact that serve to explain why the use plan for the artefact achieves its goal.

The arguments and differing views of these two chapters set the stage for the rest of the book. In fact, designing, making, and using artefacts – and the relationships between them – are addressed in various ways in all the other chapters, for example, in relation to the significance of multi-purpose artefacts and the transformation of artefacts in ongoing activities.

II. Things in the World of the Child

How do young children come to develop a sense of things having a proper function – an inherent, 'impersonal' meaning – and how might this depend upon the particular cultural context? These questions are only beginning to be addressed by developmental psychologists. Indeed, the way children relate to things more generally has been neglected within psychology. In part, this has been the legacy of the developmental theorist, Jean Piaget. Despite treating the interactions between children and objects as the foundation of development ('sensori-motor' intelligence'), Piagetian theory, along with most of cognitive psychology, posits abstract thinking ('formal operations') as the culmination of the developmental process. Even the social-cultural theory of Vygotsky, widely regarded as a radical alternative to Piagetian theory, itself posits a process of decontextualization, through a developmental transition from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal (Wertsch, 1996).

In one important respect, matters have become even worse within developmental theory in recent years. In going beyond Piaget, many developmental psychologists now stress the importance of domain specific knowledge, and regard the developing child as a 'theorist', forming and elaborating theories restricted to highly specific domains. In particular, 'the Theory of Mind' approach, which has been dominant within developmental psychology for the last decade, has largely removed the issue of children's use of objects from the research agenda, not only because of its emphasis

upon 'mind', but also because of its explicit separation of children's understanding of other people from their understanding of things.

Autism, according to this approach, is a disorder stemming from a specific failure to understand other minds, and, furthermore, one that affects the child's ability to relate to other people, but not to things. In their chapter, on 'Autism and object use', Emma Williams and Linda Kendell-Scott present evidence of extensive delay and disruption for autistic children in their dealings with things, not least in the 'proper' use of objects (the topic of the chapters in Section 1 of this book). As they point out, even if the Theory of Mind account were correct, such disruption in object use should have been expected, given the way we normally come to learn about novel objects, by being introduced to them by other people, noticing other people using them, and entering into the standard practices in which things have their place. However, Williams and Kendell-Scott argue that the fundamental division between people and things, assumed by the Theory of Mind approach, is untenable: the widespread failure to use things *properly* in commonly understood ways must itself set powerful obstacles to relating to other people and communicating with them.

The unwordliness of psychological theory is further challenged by Ágnes Szokolszky. Her chapter on 'Object use in pretend play' is concerned with the impressively resourceful way in which young children can incorporate objects into their play activity, make-believing these things are something they are not. At one of the workshops on which this book is based, Szokolszky used the example of her young son announcing, somewhat unpromisingly, that his discarded sock was a 'gun'. But her son then held the sock taut between his two hands, and 'aimed' it at her. The fact that things lend themselves to so many pretend uses (and indeed practical uses) has encouraged theorists to suppose that the ability to engage in imaginative play with objects is purely 'cognitive,' and little, if anything, to do with the play object itself. Yet it is just not true that we can do *anything* with *anything*. The fact that any object could in principle be used in an infinite variety of ways, does not mean that their functionality is completely unconstrained. Socks may lend themselves to being used as pretend guns, but they do not make good pretend houses, nor even swords.

The puzzle for researchers of cognitive development has been that pretend play seems to be highly anomalous. After all, one might suppose that the developing child should be concerned with finding out how things *really* work, rather than delighting in treating them in such 'unrealistic' ways. Ágnes Szokolszky's research has nicely demonstrated that young children are well aware of the suitability – the 'affordances' – of different objects for particular kinds of play event, such as using those objects as a pretend pillow. Her conclusion, therefore, is that children are not 'escaping' from reality when they engage in pretend play, but rather they are, in an important sense, getting things *right*. They are exploring the various action possibilities of objects, over and above their proper functions.

These two chapters on object use and autism, and pretend play, were informed by a broadly 'ecological' framework (Gibson, 1979; see also Costall, 1995). Kristine Jensen de López's research is situated within the new perspective of 'cognitive linguistics,' an approach that takes the human body as a fundamental source of

linguistic meaning. Her chapter compares how Zapotek and Danish speaking children comprehend spatial relations. Zapotek, a Mayan language, describes the spatial relationships between objects in terms of body parts (head, stomach, etc), rather than the prepositional forms used in Danish and English. When the children in her study were asked to imitate the experimenter's actions of putting items *in*, *on*, or *under* a basket, there were striking differences between the two groups of children. Even when the experimenter had placed the item *on* or *under* the basket, the Danish children were much more likely to put the object *in* the basket than were the Mayan children. Kristine Jensen de López proposes, however, that these differences cannot solely be understood in terms of linguistic differences, but also in terms of how things are normally used differently in the two groups. The human body itself is configured differently according to these different uses of objects. In the Mayan culture, objects are routinely used in multiple ways, as when a basket is turned upside down to serve as a cage to confine a chicken about to lay its eggs.

Each of the chapters in this section is concerned with the question of the proper function of objects, and raises the further questions (already addressed in the first section) of how the proper function of an object is to be construed theoretically, and how children (at least under certain cultural conditions) come to develop a sense that objects have such a privileged, proper meaning. Proper function is defined culturally, and its definition depends on the ways of designing and using things within a particular culture.

III. Transformation and Things

From the perspective of the human sciences, an emphasis upon the importance of *things* in human affairs can often seem like a retreat into reductionism and materialistic determinism. However, in the present book, objects are far from considered in isolation, but, instead, as participating in human activities. The three chapters in this section are concerned with things in transformation: how things are incorporated into our activities over the course of time, and, how, in that process, they come into new relations with other things and other people, and thus take on new significance.

As we have already noted, much of the existing research on how people relate to things has concerned information technology and, furthermore, information technologies relatively new to the users. It has also typically focused on team-work. Seldom has the research taken a longer-term historical perspective, tracing the processes by which the material resources for various practices themselves both become shaped and, in turn, shape those practices (but see Hutchins, 1995). And, most importantly, there has been little research pitched at the level of everyday engagements with 'low-tech' objects used primarily by single individuals.

David de Léon has been studying people in the course of preparing and cooking meals in their own homes. As he explains in his chapter on the 'Cognitive biographies of things', there is no single locus of order in such activities, but a continual interplay

between the human agents and the things they are using. Order is ‘bounced’, as it were, between agent and the objects in this process, as in the deliberate acts of ‘maintenance’, where time is set aside to rearrange things so that they can support the next phase of the activity. But this can also come about unintentionally, as when frequently used objects end up being conveniently close to hand precisely because they are likely to have been recently used, and thus left drying, for example, on the plate rack.

The chapter focuses on the history of a spice rack over the course of almost thirty years, and how it was transformed over this period according to the circumstances and interests of its main user. Initially, the collection of spices was very small and not even kept in a rack but in a box; as it grew larger, it was then set out on a deep shelf, and then, finally, on an extensive set of shallow, one-jar deep, shelves.

The ‘cognitive congeniality’ of any object, should be regarded not as an intrinsic property of that object, but, as David puts it, concerns ‘the *combination* of techniques, procedures, and / or habits, with particular artefacts and task environments, in relation to specific tasks’. For example, only if the spice jars are removed one at a time can the shelves serve to ‘remind’ the user about where a jar that has just been removed needs to be returned. Furthermore, from a much broader temporal perspective, this *thing*, the spice rack, far from being a pre-existing, fixed resource for cookery, has itself been undergoing continual transformation and elaboration within the activities of cookery.

Hysse Birgitte Forchhammer’s chapter, ‘The woman who used her walking stick as a telephone,’ also takes up the issue, raised in Section 1, of the proper function of things. Her research explores the many different ways that the aids provided to stroke patients fail to be used ‘as intended’ – as a result of poor design, unanticipated changes in the circumstances of the user, and the fact that such aids can serve to trap the user into an identity of a disabled person. However, her chapter also presents many examples of improvisation, as when one woman used a walking stick to communicate with her neighbour, by tapping on the ceiling. The analysis she presents not only ranges across the different levels of definition of function (the ‘mass’ or impersonal, the interpersonal, and the individual), but has, as she points out, also important practical implications for the design of disability aids.

Many of the contributors to this book highlight the multiple ways a single object can be used, in improvisation and in pretend play. And, as Kristine Jensen de López argues in her chapter, there are cultural differences in the extent to which things are supposed to have a single, privileged function. Yet certain objects even in Western culture are distinguished by their multifunctionality. One kind of multifunctionality is exemplified by the Swiss army knife with its numerous blades and gadgets, but this is no more than a concatenation of specific tools with definite functions. The computer is an example of multifunctionality in a much more interesting sense. Now the digital computer was envisaged, from the outset, as a ‘general purpose machine’, that is, a machine whose function was to be constrained solely by the computer program and not by the machine itself. Even so, the computer has still managed

to enter into our lives in a whole diversity of ways unanticipated by its original designers, not least as a resource for play.

Estrid Sørensen's chapter, 'The politics of things', is about the 'open' nature of computer technology, and describes the design and use of virtual reality software for groups of young children to create their own micro-worlds. What constitutes the design, she argues, is not just the computer interface provided by the software but also the surrounding pedagogical practices. Although Sørensen is specifically concerned with an open-ended design, it is never the case that a design can completely *prescribe* practices, any more than rules fully define their application. Thus, it is necessary in general, Sørensen argues, to study the continual interplay between design and practices, and how this interplay leads to orderings *in* practice and *of* practice (Mol & Law, 1994). Fluidity and regionality are examples of such orderings. By drawing upon two instances from her study of the design workshop, Sørensen shows that these two orderings may either co-exist harmoniously or conflict in ongoing practices.

Sørensen traces the transformation of designs in ongoing practice through the introduction of new objects, the children's ideas, their discussions, and division of labour. In that sense, Sørensen proposes that we should regard design as politics, in which a design is proposed, picked up, continued, and either changed or left unchanged. Studies of such continuing processes of design in practice may lead to a better understanding of how best to design for ongoing, open-ended practices within both the school setting and beyond.

IV. Organisation and Things

The chapters in this book are primarily about how things are used by individual users or informal groups. The four chapters in the final section, however, examine the active role of things in the organisation of practices and in the practices of organisations, and bring out the wider cultural, social, organisational, economic, and educational aspects of things and how they are used. In most theoretical approaches to things, classification is assumed to be the most natural way of understanding objects. Yet, 'sorting things out' (Bowker & Star, 1999) is not the only way we engage with objects. Once we consider things, not as isolated objects or artefacts, but as already involved in ongoing practices, we can no longer take their classification for granted. Classificatory practices are themselves rather special kinds of activities, often subservient to other ends in practice. Indeed, the relevant 'properties' of things, and the proper functions of those things, are transformed within those practices.

Furthermore, once we situate things within practices, the stability of things and the stability of practices can be seen as inseparable, and as mutually affording each other. Things are involved in both maintaining and changing the order of social practices. They are ordered and reordered, and they are arranged and rearranged in and for particular social practices (Dreier, 2005, Schatzki, 2002). Thus, in order to make sense of the human practices of organisations and of organising, it is necessary to include the various *things* involved.

In their chapter, ‘Working with material things: From essentialism to material-semiotic analysis of sociotechnical practice’, Finn Olesen and Randi Markussen describe their field study of socio-technical practice in a hospital ward concerning the introduction of a an electronic module for dispensing medication. Their approach is based in science and technology studies, in which people and things are regarded as intertwined in heterogeneous sociotechnical arrangements. Rather than regarding things as somehow *pre-given objects* with definite known qualities, they are studied as *dynamic elements* in a continuous flow of activity. Similarly, design itself should be understood as an evolving process in an ongoing practice. A practice (even one involving conflict) may attain stability for some time, due to a dynamic, interdependent evolution of things and humans which stabilises particular relations between them. This was the case for the medication list in their study, so that it became a ‘stable actor’ within the hypercomplex, sociotechnical arrangements of the ward.

Following Haraway (1997), Olesen and Markussen maintain that social relationships may become congealed into and located within objects as ‘decontextualized things’. Material and semiotic dimensions of reality are thus interwoven, and material artefacts, such as the medication list, also comprise ‘fictional’ constructions (compare the chapters by Szokolszky and Forchhammer). Olesen and Markussen are engaged, as they put it, in an investigation into the ‘mundane philosophy of things’ in everyday practice. They criticize the notion that a thing is the sum of its properties since properties are not inherent to the object, but ascribed to it through a process of classification and comparison with other, similar things. In the case of the electronic medication module this becomes very evident in practice, since there was a struggle over its definition and use, and thus no single classification scheme was able to unify the competing classifications and exhaust the essence of the thing.

Despite the intentions of its original designers, the electronic medication record does not in fact function as a ‘classification machine’ that ensures widespread order within the organization. It can only be understood in terms of how it is embedded in the ongoing practices in the ward, such as the closely linked practices of writing and reading and measuring medication. Olesen and Markussen’s chapter serves to expand a conception of writing as a practice linking people and things in the material fabric of the world and things.

This theme is also central to Steven D. Brown and David Middleton’s chapter, ‘Words and things: Discursive and non-discursive ordering in a networked organization’. They focus on the active role of email archives in a company producing a complex product in a process distributed across different parts of the world, and upon the relationship between words and things within the unfolding organisational practices. In part, they are attempting to move critically beyond a background of discursive psychology and studies of communication in the work place which, they argue, consider things simply as formulated and described by speakers. Within that standard approach, the social is the standard against which to consider the role of things, and the things themselves are thus regarded as external to sociality.

However, instead of just asking how we *talk* about things, Brown and Middleton argue that we should also ask how things become fit objects for talking *about*, and how things make us talk with each other in particular ways, perform activities in particular ways, manage in particular ways, and so forth. In accordance with this alternative point of view, they ask how the archival practices concerning the emails in the company order the socialities of its organisational practice. Organisational order, they contend, is produced not only by discursive but also by non-discursive means.

Brown and Middleton consider the archives as a means of creating and maintaining order and stability in the practice of the organisation by creating interdependencies between persons and things. Furthermore, this organisational order stretches across different times and places, drawing together a large number of people, materials and activities around the entire world. The creation of schedules requiring everyone to adhere to the same strict programme of events is a distinct feature of this ordering across times and places by means of the archives. We might add that the creation of schedules leads to the creation of sequences (Abbott, 2001), that is, a sequential order (Dreier, 2005). A further means of creating and maintaining order across places is the modularisation of the complex process of production across diverse production sites, ordered into a coherent process of production by means of the scheduling and sequencing accomplished through the email archives. That, in turn, has created new problems of order in the organisational practice of the company.

In his chapter, 'Learning to do things with things – Apprenticeship learning in bakery as economy and social practice', Klaus Nielsen also examines ongoing practices in which things and people participate in dynamic, transforming and changing ways. However, since doing things with things is mostly something we have to *learn* to do, his research has been examining how the arrangement of education in work practices mediates the way we learn to do things and thus come to do things with things. For this purpose, he adopts a social practice theory of learning as situated in particular ongoing practices and in particular arrangements of learning and education (Dreier, 2003; Lave, 1993).

In his interviews with apprentice bakers about their training, Nielsen found they were concerned with economic issues rather than 'learning'. Yet, according to the apprentices, all issues relating to economy were neglected in the training provided at the trade school. While learning in school is arranged by dissecting the topic into elements to be learned sequentially as accumulated discrete categories and skills, practical considerations about the organisation of work and economical considerations led to a quite different arrangement of learning in the bakery itself. Here 'economy' is to be understood in both the sense of market economy and also the maximisation of efficiency in the use of time, materials, resources, and so forth. According to the ideal of school learning, however, such economic issues, so central to apprenticeship, are dismissed as incidental, and a distraction from the proper business of learning. In contrast, in the bakery, these economic issues are an essential part of what needs to be learnt. The apprentices, journeymen and masters alike emphasized this positive, enabling influence of economy on learning in the

educational arrangement in the bakery. It is also the case that the form taken by this learning process – the sequence of close initial supervision gradually leading towards increased 'individual autonomy' – was clearly economically motivated.

However, as Nielsen explains, there are aspects of the economic realities of the actual work situation that are far from benign. The craft of baking is challenged from two sides. There is the deskilling of the baker apprentices promoted by the growing industrialisation of baking (Braverman, 1974; Projektgruppe Automation und Qualifikation, 1987). Second, there is the issue of 'commodity aesthetics' (Haug, 1971), since the bakers have to learn to adopt the perspective of the potential customer, and place a higher priority on the 'look' of the product, than how it actually tastes. Indeed, as Nielsen pointed out at one of the workshops that gave rise to this book, the bakers are now required even to dress up in special clothing in order to *look* more like bakers.

A recurrent theme in this book concerns the need to understand things not in isolation but in relation to the human activities in which they are involved, and the different, even conflicting, meanings things can have for the people involved with them. Another main theme has concerned the need to think of design not as a separate stage prior to the use of things, but as a continuing process within the context of their actual use. Gustavo Ribeiro's chapter, 'Urban makings: formalisation of informal settlements in Thailand' is about changes in the landscapes and infrastructures of small third-world low-income settlements such as the development of walkways or bridges, either with or without the assistance of architects and other experts external to the local community. As far as the first- and third-world experts are concerned, such developments should be regarded primarily as 'sites for social activities' with the paradoxical consequence that the material products of such construction projects – the things themselves – are regarded as merely incidental to the business of empowering and unifying communities in the process of planning and construction.

Ribeiro draws a telling contrast with his earlier studies on the creation of urban landscapes and patterns of urban change in Latin American shanty-towns. Here, simply by moving between one place to another across open ground in the course of their daily lives, the people created beaten tracks on the ground which came to define a network of footpaths; these, in turn, became the source of the layout of the shanty towns that were eventually constructed on the previously open sites. The formations of physical environments/structures and of social relations are inseparable aspects of the organisation and change of ongoing everyday practices. Ribeiro contrasts such long-term, unplanned, urban making through 'direct action' with 'mediated urban making' brought about through the intervention of external actors and the introduction of formal planning procedures. Such 'mediated urban making' creates a form of practice in which experts are positioned in such a way that they come to frame the practice they are involved in making solely in terms of organisation and education (much in the way that, as Brown and Middleton in their chapter argue, things in social theory can become relegated to mere subjects of talk).

Ribeiro points to a serious consequence of the definition of the process of construction not just as educational but also as ceasing with the creation of the

'final structure'. The project-mediated form of making downplays the importance of the maintenance of the constructed object through use, and the incorporation of physical intervention into the daily life of the community. It thus threatens the very sustainability of any project. Such externally imposed organisation of projects complicates and distorts the interrelations between the material and social aspects of practices so that the material landscapes themselves tend to be reduced to mere 'sites of the social' (Schatzki, 2002). Ribeiro argues that the role of material transformations in daily social practices must be brought to the fore, and the understanding of the role of projects must be re-anchored in such ongoing daily practices.

Finally, Ribeiro also addresses the issue of stability and change that has also been raised in many of the earlier chapters. Compared to consolidated urban areas, squatter settlements have an inherent power to change and adapt. In contrast to the 'permanence and persistence' of urban structures, we are presented with changes – 'instead of morphology, patterns of use'. Such settlements are transitory, and any stability that might arise must be understood as an accomplishment of ongoing practices.

Conclusion

The beaten paths studied by Ribeiro in his research on shanty towns provide a vivid example of the kind of understanding of things presented in this book – things not as fixed and independent of human beings, but as themselves transformed, even coming into being, within ongoing human practices, and which, in turn, transform those practices. We learn much more about both people *and* things by studying them as worldly, though not just as in the world, but as incorporated in *practices* in the world (Holzkamp, 1996). However, there also needs to be an emphasis upon process, upon change. Stability is not the 'natural' state of things. Objects cannot be understood as static entities with fixed categories. Even stability must be understood as processual, one stable pattern giving rise to another. So stability is never final but open to further unanticipated change. Things are never entirely resolved, once and for all.

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