

Chapter 1

Introduction: Tourism, Development and National Identity

Globalization presents dual challenges for the nation-state in the early 21st century: National development and national identity. What role does the state have in achieving national development, or for that matter, is *national* development still possible? And, perhaps more fundamentally, how is a national identity maintained and reproduced, especially under conditions of rapid social and economic change? These questions are striking today in many parts of the world, from former eastern bloc countries and new nations in Eastern Europe, to rapidly developing countries in Asia and Latin America, to post-conflict and commodity rich nations in Africa.

This book addresses these questions by examining the Republic of Ireland over the past two decades, with special attention given to the tourism sector. Ireland is a logical choice for two reasons: First, it constitutes a development “success story” having gone from one of the poorest countries in Western Europe in the mid-1980s to one of the richest in that span. Today it has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world and is ranked fifth in the United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP 2007/8). Moreover, the country has achieved that status by embracing the world economy, high tech industries and foreign investment. As a result, Ireland has gained the attention of scholars and policy makers interested in developmental “lessons.” Second, due in part to this very economic transformation, along with accompanying social and economic changes, Ireland is facing challenges to its national identity. What does it mean to be Irish in 2008?

Tourism, Development and National Identity

This book begins from two premises. One is that national development and national identity should be studied in tandem. Development constitutes a nationalist project. Development strategies—the package of public policies aimed at economic growth, increased revenues in state coffers, jobs growth and improved welfare for the population—are always undertaken in the name of the nation. The question of nationalism and national identity, in turn, is ongoing and will always be affected by social, economic and political changes associated with development. A second premise is that studying industries is particularly fruitful, and, more specifically, tourism has much to tell us about each topic. Tourism is, by many measures, the world’s largest single economic activity, accounting for as much as 10 percent of world economic output and one in 12 jobs (WTTC 2008). Despite the fact

that tourism has played a central role in Ireland's economic transformation, it is surprisingly understudied. International tourism arrivals and receipts to Ireland between 1986 and 2007 grew faster than the overall economy. Yet most studies of the so-called "Celtic Tiger" tend to focus on leading high-tech industries such as computer software, pharmaceuticals and financial services. Undoubtedly they played a central role in the transformation of Ireland, but they only tell part of the story. Growth in tourism and travel is another key part and deserves attention as well.

Beyond development, tourism and tourism marketing also tell us much about national identity. The Irish government has long been a leading international marketer of tourism and in the 1990s became a pioneer in the area of "nation branding." Nation branding is a growing phenomenon among nation-states and constitutes a fruitful area in reading national identity formation. Although brands are presumably marketed to an external audience, the content of branding both says a great deal about the state's vision of the nation—who it is or hopes to be—and also speaks to its own citizenry. In Ireland, tourism branding has been at the forefront of nation branding and therefore deserves attention. Indeed Tourism Ireland, Ltd., the government company¹ charged with marketing Ireland abroad, introduced a brand update at the end of 2007 as a centerpiece of its current marketing strategy.

The remainder of the chapter spells out these issues in more detail. The first part discusses development and national identity in an era of globalization. The second discusses Ireland as a case study and a third makes a more detailed case for studying tourism. These lead up to Chapter 2, which discusses theoretical approaches to each and specifies an analytical model

Globalization, Development and Reproducing the Nation

Globalization is one of those murky yet seemingly all-powerful forces facing nations today. Definitions abound. O'Sullivan (2006, 1) is typical in suggesting that globalization "refers to the increasing interdependence and integration of economies, markets, nations and cultures." In other words, what goes on in one nation not only delimits possibilities for others, but in fact is itself most likely connected to factors outside of its borders. Globalization also contains many facets. One can discuss the globalization of trade, finance, communications, technology and culture, for instance, yet each respective processes possess a pace and logic of their own (Appadurai 1996; Castells 1997). The debates surrounding globalization are many and, in many cases, already a bit tired. Can we measure globalization? Which measurements are most warranted? Is globalization really

1 In fact, the limited company represents the island of Ireland, in other words, both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. It was formalized in the wake of the Belfast Accords between North and South in 1998.

new? Is it good or bad? Who or what is driving it? Is it consistent with democracy/equality/welfare? Can it be stopped?

Brand New Ireland? is most immediately concerned with the implications of globalization for the nation. On the extremes, some claim that the nation-state as a political unit faces its final days due to the pressures of globalization. As long ago as 1969 Charles Kindleberger announced “the nation state is just about through as an economic unit” (cited in Wade 1996, 60). The response has been equally strong, with many contending the death of the nation-state as being premature. Others see nation-states not as a dying breed but as increasingly constrained by everything from ideology and identity (Huntington 2005), immigration (Sassen 1998), global markets (Ohmae 1995) to the environment (Conca 2005). This approach seems more balanced and also more promising, especially for purposes here. The increased global mobility of capital along with the internationalization of production undoubtedly constrain developmental choices made by governments much more today than even two decades ago. This is especially true for small, late developing economies. For many globalization boosters and critics alike, (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Fisher 2003; Stiglitz 2002; Wade 2003), these changing markets produce an imperative of orthodoxy: The global economy, which is experiencing an ever-growing rationalization and liberalization, is like a bus. Developing countries therefore face a stark choice. They can either get on the bus by rationalizing and liberalizing their own economy, government spending and regulatory frameworks, or they can stand by as it passes them by.

The result is that the bulk of the development and globalization debate today is among pro and anti-globalization factions. Globalization is most commonly equated with neoliberalism and therefore the forces behind globalization (the WTO, IMF, World Bank, Thomas Friedman, Davos, the U.S. government) face off against opponents (anti-globalization protesters, Hugo Chavez, environmentalists, global justice movements, etc.). This is not to claim that there is no value to this line of research—it does, after all, directly address the politics of globalization—instead the point is simply that the debate is one dimensional. What it misses is what development in the early 21st century means. As McMichael (2000) and others have pointed out, globalization *as* development promises (truly or falsely) material benefits, wealth and westernization, yet states must sacrifice sovereignty and the ability to provide social safety nets in order to achieve it. Yet increasingly, the logic holds that there is but one path to such an outcome. In addition, much of the debate has been about the desirability of such an outcome while ignoring the political requisites necessary for achieving it.

The question of national development today poses challenges for not only policy makers but for scholars as well. How do we understand *national* development in a globalizing world? To be sure, we may still use traditional indicators of economic development such as growth rates, GDP per capita, exports, etc., along with various social indicators. As Gereffi (1995) suggested, in a rapidly changing and fluid global economy, the primary unit of analysis students have been using—national development—may have lost its salience. Instead development is best considered

as nested in a basket of indicators and phenomena. O'Hearn (2001), among others, argues that local developmental change can only be understood within a larger regional or global context. This approach tells a different story of development, one not of national policy directly leading to development outcomes, but instead of incorporating comparison (McMichael 1990), where regional and global factors delimit possibilities. This remains a macro-oriented approach, and is consistent with regionalist approaches to development (Stallings 1995; Amin and Thrift 1996; Kumssa and McGee 2001).

An alternative approach is one of studying sectors or industries. One method for doing so is examining the evolution of leading industries within the economy as part of mapping production profiles (Gourevitch 1986). Gereffi's (1990) work on development patterns does just that, looking at the leading economic activities within a country, the extent to which they are inwardly or outwardly oriented, and identifying the leading firms in those industries. This approach is consistent with traditional understandings of the international division of labor, where wealthy countries concentrated on capital and technologically-intensive manufacturing activities while poor nations provided mainly commodities and some labor-intensive manufacturing. Developmental progress under such a division took place when a country developed its own indigenous industries in, for instance, automobiles or consumer electronics. Import substitution programs did what they advertised, developing indigenous economic activities aimed at replacing earlier imported products. The shift to globally integrated production and distribution, however, changed all that. No longer was the goal to develop a wholly integrated (but often second rate and expensive) indigenous computer industry domestically; instead it was to develop a niche within the *global* computer industry. The goal of industrial development now became the goal of industrial upgrading within global production networks (Shapiro 1994; Evans 1995; Paus 2005).

Also missing from this discussion of globalization is the more human element. For many analysts, globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon, and therefore can be measured through trade and monetary statistics. Stiglitz (2002, 9), for instance, defines globalization as:

Fundamentally, it is the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.

Some of the more recent literature on globalization includes economic aspects but goes further. Scholte (2002, 13-4), for instance, defines globalization as "the spread of transplanetary—and in recent times more particularly supraterritorial—connections between people. From this perspective, globalization involves reductions in barriers to transworld contacts." In addition to its economic dimension, therefore, globalization involves a new spatiality that is "intimately

interlinked with shifts in patterns of knowledge, production, governance, identity, and social ecology” (Ibid., 15). Instead of experiencing their world as part of a community, locality or nation, “More people, more often, and more intensely engage with the world as a single place” (Ibid., 16).

This explicitly raises the question of identity. Ibrahim (2004, 115) argues that globalization both homogenizes and fragments, challenging existing identities. This is especially true when existing communities face rapid social and economic change associated with globalization. Castells (1997) sees globalization and traditional identities to be inherently oppositional forces. While many claim that globalizing culture dominates and ultimately replaces indigenous culture and identity, however, he views resurging local identity as a source of resistance, a means of claiming and maintaining the unique self and sense of existing community and reacting against. Some go as far as to claim that globalization, in fact, is the true source various modern ethnic and nationalist conflicts (Anderson 1992). Yet such claims appear to be excessive and their direct correlation is unlikely. The relationship between globalization and identity is not, in fact, all together clear. This should not be surprising given that we know the scope and effects of globalization are temporally and spatially uneven. So, too, will be the effect on existing identities.

Kennedy (2001, 1-2) asserts that despite the power of globalization, the nation and nationalism “continue to provide a pivotal axis around which individuals and collectivities frame their sense of cultural affiliation and feelings of belonging.” In other words, while ordinary people are increasingly exposed to global forces, their primary identity remains fixed to the nation. This may be the case, but we still need to address how ideas of the nation itself change. Undoubtedly, as globalization contributes to social, economic, environmental, cultural and demographic change, national identity must undergo reconceptualization. Most current understandings of national identity argue that re-imagining the nation takes place continually, but globalization may intensify this process while adding new actors and ultimately new possibilities. The task for scholars is to map the sources and substance of evolving national identity.

The Irish Case

The Republic of Ireland constitutes an ideal case for studying globalization, development, and national identity. The country has been fundamentally transformed economically and socially over the past two decades. Economically, the “Celtic Tiger” was fueled by foreign investment and high-tech growth that revolutionized Ireland from one of the poorest countries in the EU-15 to one of its wealthiest. In the mid-1980s, Ireland’s unemployment rate was over 18 percent, more than double the European average. Despite extensive use of EEC regional development funds from Brussels, Ireland had one of the highest poverty rates in Europe. Real GDP growth between 1980 and 1986 was flat and in 1987 per capita

Table 1.1 Irish Economic Performance, 1981-2005

Period	1981-1986	1987-1993	1994-2000	2000-2005
Real GDP (%)	2.1	4.8	9.0	5.2
Real GNP (%)	0.1	4.1	8.4	4.2
Unemployment Rate (%)	13.8	15.2	9.5	4.3
Inflation (%)		2.5	2.7	3.4

Source: OECD; Government of Ireland, Central Statistics Office (CSO).

GDP was 63 percent of that of the European Union average (Breathnach 1998, 305). Meanwhile, overall debt was skyrocketing to 148 percent of GNP, with debt servicing eating up 12 percent of GNP and one-third of all tax revenues annually (NESC 1986). Irish debt servicing was among the highest in the industrialized world.

Fueled by a new wave of foreign investment, low corporate tax rates, and a neocorporatist pact between government, business and labor, Ireland's economic fortunes changed quickly. Ireland's GDP growth outpaced every other OECD country between 1990 and 2000, growing by more than seven percent per year (Smith 2005, 39). During the last half of the 1990s, Irish economic growth also outpaced that of the East Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as other dynamic economies in Asia such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Although Ireland experienced its own high tech "bubble" and experienced a brief economic downturn in 2001-02, its economic growth has remained consistently higher than that of Western Europe. Aside from growth, the structure of the Irish economy was also transformed, led by what Ó Riain termed a "Developmental Network State" that was able to "nurture localized Post-Fordist networks of production and innovation within global investment flows by shaping the character of the various local connections to global technology and business networks" (2004, 4-5). As a result, by 2000 agriculture, long the backbone of the Irish economy, declined to just four percent of GDP; meanwhile services, including a booming ICT and financial services subsector, accounted for 58 percent (White 2001).

By 2007, Ireland ranked fifth in the UNDP's Human Development Index—behind Iceland, Norway, Australia and Canada respectively—with an adjusted per capita GDP of more than \$38,000. Unemployment fell to below four percent by the early 2000s, and even after 2001 when the head of the Irish Central Bank claimed that the era of the Celtic Tiger was over, Ireland has continued to experience rapid economic growth fueled by a building boom, skyrocketing real estate values, and ever-increasing personal consumption. Table 1.1 summarizes improvements in

growth rates, unemployment and inflation. National debt fell to 81 percent of GDP by 1995 and 27.4 percent in 2005, one of the lowest among OECD countries.

To be sure, economic dynamism in Ireland has not been without its problems. As Kuhling and Keohane (2007) point out, Irish people on average have the highest level of individual debt among OECD countries. Income inequality has increased and is now among the worst in the OECD (Kirby 2002). By the beginning of the current decade, Irish government social spending as a share of GDP ranked last by far among EU-15 members. The relative poverty rate remained near 17 percent, resembling the profile of post Soviet-bloc countries (CSO 2007). Social indicators also varied, with rates of binge drinking, depression and suicide all spiking. Dualism in health care and education has grown steadily, as those who can afford private options increasingly choose them over underfunded public ones. Although the Economist Intelligence Unit referred to Ireland as “the happiest country in the world” in 2004 (see Kuhling and Keohane 2007, 3), the label hides a myriad of social problems.

Despite these challenges, the implications of this growth and change for Irish society cannot be overstated. After suffering through a series of stop-go growth cycles from the foundation of the state through the 1980s, Ireland has experienced the longest period of economic expansion in its history. Although inequality remains high (Allen 2000; Kirby 2002; Kirby and Murphy 2007), vast numbers of Irish citizens have become suddenly upwardly mobile. White (2001, 14) argues “[t]he success of the economy has also given a sense of confidence and pride to a nation who for so long lacked their own state and the capacity to improve their material standard of living.”

Ireland’s developmental model has been predicated on globalization. Today Ireland possesses a very open economy with high levels of trade and foreign investment. Trade as a percentage of GDP increased from 50 percent in 1986 to more than 91 percent in 2000, ranking second highest among OECD countries after Luxembourg (OECD 2007). By 2005 the figure grew to 149 percent (AT Kearny/*Foreign Policy* 2007). Ireland also became a full-fledged Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) during this period, with value added in industry moving from just over one quarter of the economy to more than 35 percent. Meanwhile agriculture, the traditional backbone of the Irish economy for many years, fell to just over 2 percent of the total value added in the economy by 2005 (Ibid.). Much of the success of the “Celtic Tiger” is also based on high-tech foreign investment. More than 1,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) have set up affiliates in Ireland, lured by access to the European Union, low corporate taxes, and a highly educated, English-speaking workforce (IDA 2007). By the 1990s Ireland became an export platform for many TNCs, especially those concentrated in the health care, electronics and computer software industries (O’Hearn 2001; Kirby 2002; Breathnach 1998). By 2000 more than 48 percent of all Irish workers in manufacturing worked for affiliates of TNCs, highest among OECD nations (OECD 2007). During that time Ireland has also become a hub in the international financial services sector.

As O'Sullivan (2006) summarizes, Ireland ranked as the world's most globalized country from 2002-2005 according to the AT Kearney/*Foreign Policy* magazine globalization index. The index brings together 13 separate indicators of global integration, highlighting especially economic indicators but also including human development, political factors and technological integration. Although Ireland dropped to fifth in the 2007 index, it continued to rank higher in economic indicators of globalization.

Explaining the Irish development experience has become a cottage industry in and of itself. Surveying existing literature, Kirby (2002) summarizes three positions: Mainstream, critical, and what he calls political economy approaches. Mainstream approaches stem from neoclassical economic theory and cite openness to trade and investment, industrial upgrading, and productivity gains in manufacturing as driving economic dynamism (Barry 1999; Barry and Crafts 1999; Sweeney 1999). Critical approaches, generally based in dependency and neo-Marxist theories, cite domination by foreign-owned firms, unequal distribution of economic benefits, and the tenuous future of Irish development in a highly globalized capitalist economy (O'Hearn 1998; 2000; 2001; Munck 1993; Allen 2000).

The political economy model favored by Kirby (2002) and others adopts many aspects of the critical approach but allows ample room for firm strategies along with societal and state policy variables in accounting for outcomes. Favoring an interpretation that is at once more inductive and less theoretically constraining, this approach also more directly considers politics. O'Riain and O'Connell exemplify this approach in their claim that the Irish state made timely policy interventions that "...played a critical role in promoting the successful market participation of the new internationalized professional class..." (2000, 339). Kirby (2002, 140-4) offers similar conclusions that suggest the state "governed" the market through selective direct and indirect intervention in the form of tax policies, investment in education, provision of infrastructure, yet in doing so moved from a classic welfare state to what Cerny (2000) refers to a competition state.

While promising, the political economy approach often begs political questions. How does the state move, in Evans' (1995; 1992) words, from being the problem to solution when it comes to development? In other words, state development strategies may largely explain development outcomes, but this requires an explanation of state action itself. Ireland is no exception. During the 1970s and 1980s, when economic growth languished and debt skyrocketed, the Irish state was seen by many as being incapable of making effective economic policy. Years later, however, that same state is often credited for achieving economic success. Did the state change? If so, how do we explain it?

State development policy is, of course, just one factor in explaining success. Others include demographics, such as Ireland's young, increasingly educated, English-speaking workforce. As Breathnach (1998) points out, Ireland's unique demographics within Europe meant that it added a large number of educated young people to the workforce in the late 1980s and 1990s, just in time to take advantage of regional and global economic trends, such as increased capital flows

from TNCs, especially U.S.-owned ones, in high technology sectors (O'Hearn 2001). This pattern was produced by a unique set of circumstances, including the globalization of the dot com revolution, the global boom in pharmaceuticals, and deepening of European economic integration (and related threat of regional protectionism). Meanwhile, domestically in Ireland, the signing of the first of several neocorporatist social pacts among previously feuding societal groups in 1987 created space for both a wider range of policy making and an improving business climate. The European factor also must not be overlooked. It contributed in at least two ways: First the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that preceded introduction of the Euro, helped achieve macroeconomic stability in Ireland. Second, billions of Euros in structural funds amounted to a massive development aid program and provided badly needed infrastructure and seed capital.

An alternative approach for studying Irish development has focused on sectoral or industry studies. As both the discussion above on globalization along with Chapter 2 will lay out in detail, there are good reasons for utilizing this approach. Industry studies allow for linking the local to the global by focusing on leading industries, exploitation of niches and upgrading. With respect to the Irish development experience, industrial approaches have been utilized, and they tend to focus on the high tech sectors of computer hardware, software and ICT services, and health care. Ó Riain's work (2004; 2000, Ó Riain and O'Connell 2000) on the software industry is the best known of the industry studies, but others have also explained much of Ireland's developmental success through its ability to find niches and industrial upgrading in ICT, pharmaceuticals and medical device industries (Paus 2005; T. White forthcoming; M. White 2004; van Egeraat and Jacobson 2004; O'Malley and O'Gorman 2001; Green 2000). More recently, growing attention has gone into studying the financial services sector (M. White 2003). What these studies have in common is that they examine leading and dynamic sectors of the Irish economy within the larger context of global industries.

In addition to explaining the development patterns that have emerged in Ireland over the past 20 years, a central, perhaps more crucial question is how that development has changed Irish national identity. Ireland today is a vastly different country than it was in the mid-1980s. In addition to economic transformation, the country has changed profoundly demographically, socially, religiously, and with the all-island peace process culminating in the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Accords, politically. Public opinion polls show that Irish people have become much more pro-Europe and identify with the European Union. Yet, simultaneously, they are much more attached to their country than other Europeans (O'Sullivan 2006, 40). Greater integration with Europe and rapid economic development, together with the peace accords with Northern Ireland, have led Ruane and Todd (2003) to hypothesize that the Irish are increasingly experiencing a "hybridity" of national identity. Undoubtedly, the nation remains a crucially important reference point for identity in Ireland, but exactly how that nation is conceived of deserves more attention.

Table 1.2 Tourism Annual Average Growth Rates 1985-2005

Period	Arrivals percent	Receipts percent
1986-1990	10.2	11.0
1991-1995	6.9	8.1
1996-2000	7.4	11.3
2001-2005	0.9	3.3
Total: 1987-2006	7.7	9.2

Source: Author's calculations from CSO data.

Irish Tourism

Although studying individual industries has been utilized in order to understand the dynamics of development under globalization, tourism has been left aside. This is surprising due to the sheer scope and size of Irish tourism, as well as its international orientation. International tourism arrivals to the Republic of Ireland more than tripled from 1986 to 2007, growing from less than 2 million visitors to 7.7 million. Earnings during that same time period nearly quintupled, growing from €927 million to just over €4.9 billion (Fáilte Ireland 2008). As Table 1.2 demonstrates, tourism growth gradually slowed down after 2000, yet remained impressive between the years 1986-2000. For the longer period of 1987-2006 international arrivals grew by an average of 7.65 percent annually while receipts grew by 9.2 percent. The most rapid growth took place between 1986 and 1990 when arrivals increased by average annual rates of 10.2 percent. Receipts grew by over 11 percent during that period.

The contribution of tourism to the Irish economy is frequently underestimated. According to the national tourism agency, Fáilte Ireland (2006), tourism is the largest tradable service sector in Ireland. Tourism exports represented 3.4 percent of overall exports in 2005. Tourism had more than twice that share in the late 1980s, but that was prior to the TNC-led manufactured export boom in the 1990s. Including domestic tourism revenues and applying multiplier effects, the agency estimates that tourism accounts for some 3.8 percent of GNP in 2005.

Employment figures are more difficult to estimate in that tourism cuts across several sectors of the economy, including accommodation, restaurants pubs, and tourism sites and attractions. The Irish government's Central Statistics Office (CSO) does not estimate Irish tourism employment directly. Yet Fáilte Ireland and industry sources frequently cite figures from the CSO that simply total up employment from those sectors, thereby overestimating the total employment attributable to tourism. For instance, their totals of 2005 add those employed

in hotels, guesthouses, self catering accommodation, restaurants, non-licensed restaurants, licensed premises (bars and pubs) and tourism services and attractions to come up with a total of almost 246,000. This would represent about 14 percent of all those working in Ireland, most likely making tourism the country's largest employer. Almost everyone close to the industry agrees that this number is inflated. Most estimate tourism to employ roughly 140,000 full time job equivalents. Nevertheless, despite this more sober, accurate estimate, tourism remains a central pillar of job creation. Finally, in addition to its importance to the economy as a whole, tourism is important to the state, accounting for some €2.5 billion in tax revenues in 2005 (Fáilte Ireland 2006).

As subsequent chapters show, while the computer and pharmaceutical industries may have formed the backbone of the new development model for Ireland, tourism has served as a less high profile yet integral economic activity. Most significant, it generated high numbers of jobs during the early 1990s while overall economic recovery was nearly jobless. Moreover, tourism dynamism was not simply market driven. Instead, changes in state agencies and private sector peak associations helped to make the industry a higher priority within the overall Irish development strategy. A closer examination of development patterns within the accommodation and transport sectors also shows that Ireland has been able to achieve a certain level of industrial upgrading. In short, accounting for Irish development and globalization without paying attention to tourism is incomplete and inaccurate.

Also central for this analysis, studying tourism aids in understanding the changing dynamics of national identity formation. Tourism marketing amounts to showcasing the nation, its land, history, and people—i.e., the very things that Kearns (2001, 886) argues national identities are built upon. The state is not the only player in providing tourist images, but it takes a leading role in this marketing. Therefore, examining how the state promotes the nation for tourism purposes provides a window into how the state imagines the nation itself.

One might object that marketing materials, especially related to tourism, are just that and tell us nothing about national identity. Advertising is, after all, just advertising. Promotional materials seek first and foremost to earn money through drawing the attention of tourists and tourism providers. The content of such marketing may simply reflect what real or potential consumers desire, nothing more. Yet this is precisely the point. Outsiders frequently “know” nations largely through constructs experienced by tourism (or the possibility of tourism). Lindsay (2000) defines a brand as “the totality of the thoughts, feelings, associations and expectations that come to mind when a prospect or consumer is exposed to an entity's name, logo, products, services, events, or any design or symbol representing them.” According to Clarke (2000), “[a] true brand exists as a collection of enduring intangible values in the mind of the user...and remain largely undetected by consumers.” Brands, therefore, are associational, with individuals (often unconsciously) assigning attributes of value to products, people, institutions, and places.

As the more thorough discussion on branding in Chapter 2 demonstrates, “nation branding” as a means to enhance national reputation abroad is not only on the rise; it is also oriented toward a home audience (Van Ham 2001). Although the desire of states to manage their reputations is not new (Aronczyk 2008), the utilization of modern marketing techniques is much more pronounced and systematic. As a result, in many cases branding and marketing materials present a novel set of data from which to examine the way in which the state constructs the nation.

The Irish government, through its tourism board, first introduced “Tourism Brand Ireland” in 1996 and has revised the brand three times since. In late 2007 it rolled out the current brand: “Ireland: An Island of Unique Character and Characters.” In part this branding revision reflects the difficulty in marketing a rapidly changing country to foreign tourists. Analyzing the content of that branding is particularly promising in helping us understand the tensions and challenges of remaking national identity in an increasingly globalized society.

Outline of the Book

This detailed case study of Irish tourism contributes to contemporary debates on development and national identity. Most commonly treated separately today, the two have in the past been considered in tandem (for example Young 1976). What is different here is the consideration of development and national identity within the larger context of globalization and nation branding. Ireland—with a rapidly developing and globalized economy—and Irish tourism present a useful case for investigating these issues.

The next chapter interrogates the concepts of development, national identity and nation branding in detail, leading to the presentation of an analytic model for understanding development and national identity today. Chapters 3 and 4 are public policy chapters that first look at traditional understandings of the Celtic Tiger, and then integrate tourism into the story by examining the respective roles of the state and private sector in developing Ireland’s tourism sector. Chapter 4 takes an in depth view at the evolving relationship between the state and private sector in the tourism sector specifically. Institutional changes in the national tourist board, along with the emergence of more vocal private sector are highlighted. Other factors that contributed to that growth, especially European Union structural funds, are also discussed in detail. Overall, the chapter documents the changing patterns and performance of the Irish tourism sector in light of the analytic model spelled out in Chapter 2.

Chapter 5 investigates the selling of Ireland as a tourism destination and its relationship to national identity. The chapter traces tourism marketing as a means of showcasing the nation and discusses how Ireland was portrayed to the world in earlier marketing programs. It shows that state officials “sold” Ireland very much as a developing country in that its people and place were portrayed as outside of

the modern world. The relationship between nation branding, visitor attitudes and identity is investigated more fully.

Chapter 6 investigates developmental outcomes through an in depth examination of two subindustries of tourism: Airlines and accommodation. Finally, the closing chapter summarizes findings, reconsiders the model presented above, and discusses the future prospects of tourism in the Republic of Ireland. One question has to do with the current challenges confronting Irish tourism and is best understood as tourism after development. How does modern, cosmopolitan Ireland attract foreign tourists keen on finding a bucolic, traditional Ireland? It examines how tourism branding reflects (and fails to reflect) ongoing changes in Irish society? It assesses the sustainability of Tourism Brand Ireland and situations the implications of the Irish case for our broader understanding of development and national identity formation in the age of globalization.